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INTRODUCTION

The year 1978 was by any standard an eventful year. Internationally, the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European
Patent Convention are now in effect; an extensive body of literature has developed on how we should adjust our typewriters, paper feeders, and concepts to the new systems.
The year has also been eventful in the United States
Supreme Court. The Court in Parkerv. Flook' held that a patent could not be obtained on a process which consisted of old
steps plus a newly discovered mathematical formula, or algorithm. On the heels of Flook, the Court granted certiorari in
Parker v. Bergy 2 and remanded the case to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) "for further consideration in
1. 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978), rev'g In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 195
U.S.P.Q. 9 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
2. 438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978), opinion below, In re Bergy, 563
F.2d 1031, 195 U.S.P.Q. 344 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

1979]

Recent Developments

light of Parker v. Flook." Bergy, and its companion case, In re
Chakrabarty,3 had held that living microorganisms were patentable subject matter. Upon reconsideration, the court again held
4
that living microorganisms were patentable subject matter.
The third matter before the Supreme Court was Quick Point
Pencil Co. v. Aronson.5 A divided appellate panel had held that
an agreement to pay royalties on an invention defined in a pending application became unenforceable if the application did not
issue as a patent. Recently, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that enforcement of royalty contracts on unpatentable in6
ventions does not withdraw any ideas from the public domain.
This year attorneys have resurrected an old defense and
clarified the more current ones. First, the "old combination" rejection was again used to invalidate patents. Though long considered antiquated, and rejected by most tribunals, it has been
resurrected in several cases. However, the Second Circuit has
7
definitively rejected it this past year.
A year ago there were a number of patent cases holding patents invalid for failure to comply with the "best mode" requirement of 35 U.S.C. section 112.8 The number of cases is tapering
off, and there was one important reversal this past year of a 1977
decision. 9 But the defense is still in vogue.
Many trial courts are not utilizing the Patent and Trademark Office's procedure of permitting a patentee to have the
PTO reexamine his patent in light of newly cited prior art. At
least where the patentee applies for a reissue under the "Dann
Amendments," the courts have indicated a willingness to defer
3. 571 F.2d 40, 197 U.S.P.Q. 72 (C.C.P.A. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct.
44 (1978).
4. See In re Chakrabarty, 201 U.S.P.Q. 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
5. 567 F.2d 757, 196 U.S.P.Q. 281 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1096
(1979).
6. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 99 S. Ct. 1096 (1979); WarnerLambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 123
U.S.P.Q. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd, 280 F.2d 197, 126 U.S.P.Q. 3 (2d Cir. 1960).
7. E.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 586 F.2d 917, 199
U.S.P.Q. 641 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'g 442 F. Supp. 266, 196 U.S.P.Q. 544 (D. Conn.
1977). See generally notes 231-48 and accompanying text infra.
8. The "Best Mode" defense comes from 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976), which

provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the

inventor of carrying out his invention. (emphasis added).
9. E.g., Thyssen Plastik Anger K.G. v. Induplas, Inc., 576 F.2d 400, 200
U.S.P.Q. 197 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'g 195 U.S.P.Q. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See gener-

ally notes 210-24 and accompanying text infra.
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discovery until the Office can reexamine and reassess patentability.10
Finally, a few cases this past year reflected adversely the
often-observed tendency of patent trial lawyers to over-discover,
over-brief, and over-try their cases." The respective courts have
blasted either one or both attorneys for departing from a realistic perspective.
In short, this has been a busy year.
II.

SUPREME COURT

A.

Parkerv. Flook

On June 22, 1978, the United States Supreme Court, in
Parker v. Flook,12 held that "a claim for an improved method of
calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable
subject matter under section 101.' ' *1 But the Court's holding
that "this case must. . . be considered as if the [newly discov14
ered] principle or mathematical formula were well known"'
will cause future problems.
The CCPA decision of In re Flook15 was a unanimous opinion written by Judge Baldwin which had authorized claims such
as the following:
A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at
least one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm
limit has a current value of (a certain equation) which comprises:
(1) determining the present value of said process variable ... determining a new alarm base ...

using the following equation

(omitted); (3) determining an updated alarm limit value which is
defined (by another equation) and, thereafter16 (4) adjusting that
alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
More simply stated, the idea was to measure the present value
of a process parameter such as temperature, use a newly devised mathematical formula to calculate an updated "alarm
10. 955 O.G. 1054 (February 22, 1977). For other works on patentability,
see CHISUM, PATENTS (Matthew Bender 1978); PATENT LAW CONFERENCE
COURSEBOOK, NONOBVIOUSNEss: THE STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES (BNA 1977); ROSE, 1978 PATENT LAW HANDBOOK (1978).

11. See notes 326-40 and accompanying text infra.
12. 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978), rev'g In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21,195
U.S.P.Q. 9 (C.C.P.A. 1977).

13. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) which provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition

of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." See notes
62-84 and accompanying text infra.

14. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 198.
15. 559 F.2d 21, 195 U.S.P.Q. 9 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
16. Id. at 22, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 10.
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limit" for that parameter, and then automatically adjust the
alarm limit to the updated value. The calculation was "accomin accordance with a matheplished by some type of computer
17
matical control equation.
The CCPA had observed that this was "a claim to a process
which uses an algorithm to modify a conventional manufacturing system."' 18 It had distinguished the case from its prior holding in In re Christensen19 on the basis that Christensen was
"expressly limited to claims directed to determining data used
in an algorithm and solving the algorithm, that is, to claims in
which nothing is done after solution of the algorithm. '20 There
was, in short, no "post-solution activity" or use recited in the
claims of Christensen.
The CCPA had also distinguished the holding of Gottschalk
v. Benson 2 ' stating, "The present claims do not preempt the
formula or algorithm contained therein, because solution of the
22
algorithm, per se, would not infringe the claims.
Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, declined to accept this distinction from Benson. 23 The Court reviewed some
of its earlier precedents and concluded that "[t]he process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and
useful." 24 It then launched into the troublesome holding, stating
"we think this case must also be considered as if the principle or
mathematical formula were well known."25 It added that "a scialentific principle, such as that expressed in respondent's
26
gorithm, reveals a relationship that has always existed.
This would be troublesome by itself. But then the Court
proceeded to assume that the algorithm, no matter how nonobvious, could not form the basis of a patentable claim because the
algorithm must be excluded for allpurposes in determining pat17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 478 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
20. In re Flook, 559 F.2d at 23, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 11.
21. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972), rev'g In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682,
169 U.S.P.Q. 548 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
22. In re Flook, 559 F.2d at 23, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 11.
23. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 197. 'The notion that
post solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can

transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance."
24. Id. at 591, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 198; see Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. 280 (1948); Mackay Radio v. R.C.A., 306 U.S.
86, 40 U.S.P.Q. 199 (1939).
25. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 198; accord, O'Reilly v.

Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 161 (1853).
26. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593

n.15, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 198 n.15.
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entability. 27
The majority opinion concluded, "It is our duty to construe
the patent statutes as they now read, in light of our prior precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to
extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.1 28 It ended to the effect that "we should not extend patent rights . . . unless the argument for extension of privilege is
based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory
language. We would require a clear and certain signal from
,,29 Such "[d]ifficult questions of policy concernCongress ....
ing the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent
protection and the form and duration of such protection can be
answered by Congress on the basis'30of current empirical data not
equally available to this tribunal.
The dissent phrased the issue as "whether a claimed process loses its status of subject matter patentability simply because one step in the process would not be patentable subject
matter if considered in isolation."'3 1 It recognized that
"thousands of processes and combinations have been patented
themselves
that contained one or more steps or elements that
'32
would have been unpatentable subject matter.
B. Parkerv. Bergy
Four days after Flook, the Court vacated and remanded In
re Bergy33 "for further consideration in light of Parkerv. Flook."
Bergy had obtained a composition-of-matter claim to a "biologically pure culture" of heretofore old, naturally existing, microorganisms. The issue on remand was: what part of Flook is to be
considered? Is it the first reason of Flook-exclusion of "newly
27. Id. at 594, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 198: "Respondant's process is unpatent-

able under § 101 not because it contains a mathematical algorithom as one

component, but because once that algorithom is assumed to be within prior
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention." Otherwise stated, "as if [it] . . . were well known." Id. at 592, 198
U.S.P.Q. at 198.
28. Id. at 596, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 199.
29. Id., quoting, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
173 U.S.P.Q. 769 (1972).

30. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 199.
31. Id. at 598, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 201 (Stewart, J., dissenting); cf. 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b) (1976) which provides: "The term 'process' means process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material."
32. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 599, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 201; Eibel Co. v. Minnesota &Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923) (importing the law of gravity into
the claims); see Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
33. 563 F.2d 1031, 195 U.S.P.Q. 344 (C.C.P.A. 1977), affid on remand, 201
U.S.P.Q. 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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discovered scientific principles," 34 as to which Bergy's composition of purified old material undoubtedly qualifies? Or is it the
second reason-"proceed cautiously when . . . asked to extend
35
patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress"?
things did not look too well for Mr.
Under either interpretation,
36
Bergy and his bugs.
Shortly following Bergy, the Solicitor General petitioned
the Supreme Court to vacate the decision in Bergy's companion
case, In re ChakrabartyY' He also petitioned the CCPA to vacate its decision, to recall its38mandate, and to set the case down
for reargument with Bergy.
The decisions of In re Bergy and In re Chakrabarty broke
new ground in the law. The issue was: are living microorganisms patentable? And while the CCPA, answering in the affirmative in both cases, took pains to say that "we are not
deciding whether living things in general, or at most, whether
any living things other than microorganisms, are [patentable]," 39 the decisions are of first impression.
Bergy and Chakrabartyprovided similar fact patterns. The
respective applicants had each discovered new chemical
processes. Bergy's was the fermentation preparation of an antibiotic (lincomycin) using a newly discovered natural strain of
Streptomyces bacteria. Chakrabarty's was the degradation of
spilled oil with "genetic engineered" bacteria. In neither case
was there any difficulty in obtaining patent protection on the
process.
But the respective microorganisms themselves were new,
useful, and nonobvious. 4° Bergy assured that his "invention"
was new (and did not exist in nature) by claiming a "biologically
pure culture"; Chakrabarty's microorganisms were man-created
mutants. Assuming that they might have other uses, the respective applicants sought patents on the microorganisms per se. After all, were they not a "manufacture" or "composition of
matter" within the statutory scope of patentable matter?4 1 Or
were they?
34. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 198.
35. Id. at 597, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 200.
36. On remand, the court held that Parker was not applicable. See
notes 56-59 and accompanying text infra.
37. 571 F.2d 40, 197 U.S.P.Q. 72 (C.C.P.A. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct.
44, (1978), rehearing,201 U.S.P.Q. 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979).

38. On rehearing, the court affirmed its prior holding that living organisms can be protected as new compositions or articles of manufacture. In
re Bergy, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 363.
39. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1035, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 348.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (requiring new and useful inventions).

41. See id.
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Legal precedent was remote. On the one hand, processes
which used living microorganisms had long been held patentable-ranging from the original septic tank42 through the fermentation preparation of specific chemical compounds. 43 Similarly,
synthetic counterparts of naturally existing products were patentable-vitamin B-12 had existed in livers4 and adrenalin had
been found in the adrenal glands.45 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court had held that "an inoculant for leguminous
plants comprising ... mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria" was an unpatentable "discovery of some
'46
of the handiwork of nature.
Perhaps most troublesome was the argument of the dissenters that the Plant Patent Act of 193047 was intended to "extend"
patent protection to certain plants, and yet that Act did not include bacteria. 48 If the "extended" Act did not cover bacteria,
how could the basic Act do so? Alternatively, if the basic Patent
Act, as held by Bergy and Chakrabarty, covered living things,
there should have been no need for any "extension."
The majority only partly responded. The Plant Patent Act
was enacted without any Congressional reference to microorganisms. But in any event, that Act included plants by relaxing
49
the "description" requirement applicable to other patents,
which specified that a reader must be able to produce the thing
patented, and be able to distinguish it from what is old.
While the press indicated much surprise, probably few
chemists did. In 1828, Wohler showed there was no insurmount42. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir.
1908).
43. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400, 12 U.S.P.Q.
47 (D. Del. 1931), affd, 61 F.2d 1041, 15 U.S.P.Q. 237 (3d Cir. 1932).
44. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 116
U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th Cir. 1958).
45. Parke Davis &Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd,
196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).

46. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q.
280 (1948); cf.American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 8
U.S.P.Q. 131 (1931) (borax impregnated oranges are not within the statutory
definition of "manufacture").
47. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976) which provides in relevant part:
"Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids and

newly found seedlings, other than a tuber-propagated plant or a plant found
in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent. ."
48. In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 46 U.S.P.Q. 32 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
49. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) (best mode description) with 35
U.S.C. § 162 (1976) which provides: "No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with section 112 of this title if the description is as
complete as is reasonable possible.
The claim in the specification shall be in formal terms to the plant
shown and described."
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able difference between "inorganic" and "organic" chemistry
when he heated two inorganic compounds (ammonium sulfate
5
and potassium cyanate) and produced an organic one (urea). 0
In 1953, Crick, Watson, and Wilkins blurred the boundaries between organic chemistry and biochemistry when they showed
that DNA (the genetic code) is a double helix composed of sim51
ple organic compounds.
The bottom line argument, though, was that Congress could
legislate to make anything patentable that would "promote the
progress of ... useful arts. '52 The recital of patentable subject
matter in section 101, "process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter,"5 3 is broad and only partly fills the authorization. And "there is nothing in the words of section 101 which
excludes patents for living organisms. '54 These microbes were
"useful" beyond question.
As the majority noted in Bergy, "microorganisms . . . are
much more akin to inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents, and catalysts than they are to horses and honeybees or raspberries and roses. '55 There was no reason for
"excluding [a microorganism] from the ... categories of patentground that it is alive. It is because it
able inventions on the sole
'5 6
is alive that it is useful.
On rehearing, the CCPA distinguished Flook, stating:
[T]hat the process aspects of their inventions are not only subject
matter within § 101 but also new and unobvious under § 102 and
§ 103, therefore patentable. Flook (sic) was concerned only with
the question of what is a "process" under § 101, in the context of
protection. No such issue is presented in either
computer program
57
cf these appeals.
The court then rejected the solicitor's argument that section 101
50. See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 905 (1979).
51. See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDA BRITANNICA 994 (1979). But see Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 68 U.S.P.Q. 84 (2d Cir. 1946). Note the late

date that new chemical compounds were held to be patentable as compositions of matter.
52. U.S. CONST. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
54. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1037, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 350.

55. Id. at 1038, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 351.
56. Id.; accord,In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 44,197 U.S.P.Q. at 78 (Markey, C.J., concurring). "There are but two sources for manufactures and

compositions of matter. They are God ... and man." In Chakrabarty,the
living microorganisms were man made "manufactures" or "compositions."
"No Congressional intent to limit patents to dead inventions lurks in the

lacuna of the statute." See Kiley, Common Sense and the Uncommon Bacterium-is Life Patentable?,60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 468 (1978). However, any
definitive answer must await the CCPA's holdings and then, perhaps, the
Supreme Court's.
57. In re Bergy, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 364.
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required a signal from Congress before approving the position of
the litigant to open the privilege of patents wider than Congress
had intended.5 8 Finally, the court reaffirmed the prior holding
59
that microorganisms were patentable.
III.

THE STATUTES

Although no major patent legislation was passed this year,
the courts have more thoroughly interpreted existing statutes.
This section will thoroughly examine the activities concerning
these statutes.
A.

35 U.S.C. Section 26-Photocopies of Declarations

35 U.S.C. section 26 provides that:
Any document to be filed in the Patent and Trademark Office
and which is required by any law, rule, or other regulation to be
executed in a specified manner, may be provisionally accepted by
the Commissioner despite a defective execution, provided a properly executed
document is submitted within such time as may be
60
prescribed.
The Office has indicated some concern as to whether this included the filing of photocopies of declarations. Two cases have
held section 26 applicable to the filing of photocopies of declarations where the signed declaration was not timely received by
61
the attorney responsible for filing the application.
B. 35 U.S.C. Sections 100 & 101
1.

Computer Programs

Two decisions of the CCPA prior to Parkerv. Flook,62 and
one subsequent decision, 63 concerned the patentability of programs for general purpose programmable digital computers. In
In re Freeman,64 the claims were to a "system for typesetting
alphanumeric information, using a computer-based control sys58. Id. at 365.
59. Id. at 363.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
61. E.g., Neergaard v. Dann, 198 U.S.P.Q. 525 (D.D.C. 1976); In re McDonald, 199 U.S.P.Q. 109 (C.P.T. 1978); see Commissioner'sNotice of August 28,

1978, Official Gazette, January 2, 1979 (for formalization of this procedure
but in emergencies only).
62. E.g., In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 197 U.S.P.Q. 852 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re

Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978). For a discussion of
Parker, see notes 12-32 and accompanying text supra. The Court held in
Parker that algorithms were not patentable processes.
63. E.g., In re Schreiber, 587 F.2d 59, 199 U.S.P.Q. 782 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
64. 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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tem in conjunction with a phototypesetter of conventional design" that was "especially useful in printing mathematical
formulae. ' 65 The claims were to the apparatus and to the
method. Neither the method claims nor the apparatus claims
made reference to any algorithm.
The court declined to follow the board's analysis that the
claims were merely an idea and reversed its conclusion. Because an invention was intended to be performed in conjunction
with a computer does not, by that fact alone, make claims to that
invention unpatentable. In Freeman, neither the method claims
nor the apparatus claims recited process steps which were
mathematical calculations, formulae, or equations. Consequently, they could not be tested by any interpretation of Gott67
schalk v. Benson 66 or Dann v. Johnston.
The second case, In re Toma, 68 was a reversal of a rejection
of claims to a method for translating languages. The claims involved a method and did not recite any algorithm although the
specification disclosed a computer program for the chore. In
keeping with Freeman, the Toma court looked at the entire
claim, rather than to any part of it by itself, and held that where
a claim does not "directly or indirectly recite a Benson-type algorithm, '69 it was not within the holding of Benson. 70 Benson
had used the term "algorithm" in a "specific sense, namely 'a
'7 1
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem'.
In Toma, there was no such mathematical problem. Further, a
translation method was in the "technological art," as it "is a
'72
method of operating a machine.
The third computer case, In re Schreiber,73 affirmed a rejection of claims based on art that had intervened between an earlier application (on which reliance was sought under 35 U.S.C.
65. Id. at 1238, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 465-66.
66. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972); see notes 68 &69 and accompany-

ing text infra. Benson held that ideas are not patentable-and that patenting a formula with no use but for a digital computer would in effect be a
patent of the algorithm. Id. at 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676.
67. 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1976).
68. 575. F.2d 872, 197 U.S.P.Q. 852 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
69. Id. at 877, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 855; see In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1892, 178
U.S.P.Q. 35 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
70. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972); see Dann v.

Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1976) (what would be obvious to
one reasonably skilled in the art).
71. In re Toma, 575 F.2d at 877, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 856.
72. Id. at 878, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 857. The examiner had held that only those
inventions which enhance the internal operation of the digital computer are
in the technological or useful arts. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 167

U.S.P.Q. 280 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
73. 587 F.2d 59, 199 U.S.P.Q. 782 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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section 120) and a later application. The earlier application had
disclosed generically, but not specifically, the concept of the intervening reference. The claims called for a formula which with
certain values would correspond to the intervening art.74 These
values, however, had not been taught in the earlier application.
2.

35 U.S.C. Section 101-Utility

Two important cases involved the utility, or usefulness requirement of section 101. 7 5 In Exparte Krenzer,76 a class of new
chemical compounds was claimed, and it was asserted that they
were useful as herbicides. Apparently there was little actual
proof of their herbicidal utility. The board held that statements
of utility by the applicant must be accepted as true "unless
there is reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements
contained [in the specification] .-77 Here there were no "reasonable" doubts as to whether the invention would function as
stated. "Reasonable" doubts would exist where the invention
was "highly unusual, ' 78 "incredible," 79 or "too speculative." 80
The other case involving utility was In re Sichert.8 1 In
Sichert, certain herbicidal extracts were claimed in combination
82
as being useful "against congestions in the lymphatic system.
Although not stated in the specification, the examiner had ar74. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1976) which provided in relevant part: "An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by
the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application filed in the
United States by the same inventor shall have the same effect, as to such
invention. . . ." In Schreiber, there was no such disclosure. 587 F.2d at 62,
199 U.S.P.Q. at 785.
In the first two months of 1979, three additional computer cases came
down and are briefly noted here. In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 200 U.S.P.Q. 132
(C.C.P.A. 1978), affirmed a § 103 rejection of a computer model of natural
waterways. The court noted that Congress must have intended to include
new technologies in 35 U.S.C. § 101. "Congress cannot be expected to foresee or annually amend the Patent Act." Id. at 1333, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 137. In re
Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 200 U.S.P.Q. 199 (C.C.P.A. 1978), reversed the rejection of a machine-implemented method of removing noise from seismic
data. This was patentable subject matter. Hirschfield v. Banner, 200
U.S.P.Q. 276 (D.D.C. 1978), by CCPA Chief Judge Markey, likewise reversed
the PTO, and held that a computer-controlled TV camera tube could be
claimed in process format.
75. E.g., In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 196 U.S.P.Q. 209 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Ex
parte Krenzer, 199 U.S.P.Q. 228 (Bd. App. 1978); see note 13 supra for language of § 101.
76. 199 U.S.P.Q. 227 (Bd. App. 1978).
77. Id. at 229; see In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 169 U.S.P.Q. 367 (C.C.P.A.
1971); In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 154 U.S.P.Q. 92 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
78. In re Houghton, 433 F.2d 820, 167 U.S.P.Q. 687 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
79. In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 139 U.S.P.Q. 516 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
80. In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918, 164 U.S.P.Q. 221 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
81. 566 F.2d 1154,196 U.S.P.Q. 209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
82. Id. at 1157, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 210.
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gued that the concoction was intended as a cancer cure. The
court held that the utility as a lymphatic system anti-congestive
was not "incredible" within the meaning of "speculative, incredible, esoteric, factually misleading or contrary to the common
knowledge of persons of ordinary skill. ' 83 The evidence, including a medical affidavit, satisfied section 101.84
C. 35 U.S.C. Section 102
1. PriorArt
The year brought the normal collection of inconsistent case
authorities interpreting 35 U.S.C. section 102, which, among
other things, defines what is prior art. 85 In general, the CCPA in
In re Samour86 reconfirmed prior law to the effect that two references can be "combined," in certain circumstances, to make out
a section 102 anticipation. 87 In Samour, the basic reference described a compound but gave no method for preparing it,
thereby disqualifying the reference as "non-enabling. ' 88 How83. Id. at 1159 n.5, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 213 n.5; cf. In re Houghton, 433 F.2d
820, 167 U.S.P.Q. 687 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (flying machine operation on flapping
or fluttering function); In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918, 164 U.S.P.Q. 221 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (control of aging process); In re Buting, 418 F.2d 540, 163 U.S.P.Q. 689
(C.C.P.A. 1969) (treating cancer); In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 163 U.S.P.Q.
609 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (hair restorer); In re Citron, 325 F.2d 48, 139 U.S.P.Q. 520
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (treating cancer).
84. In re Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1163, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 214. Sichert reaffirmed
In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 162 U.S.P.Q. 594 (C.C.P.A. 1969), as to whether
a patent applicant has to prove that his therapeutic composition was "safe."
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) which provides in relevant part, "A person
shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention was known or used by
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country. . ." Before discussing the cases, attention should
be directed to three articles: Gholz, Establishing 'The Time the Intention

was Made'; Janicke, What is 'PriorArt' under § 103? The Need For Policy
Thought; Rose, AscertainingDifferences-When is the 'Inventionnot Identically Disclosed or Described'? in 1977

BOOK

PATENT LAW CONFERENCE COURSE-

(BNA 1977).

86. 571 F.2d 559, 197 U.S.P.Q. 1 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
87. The term "anticipation" is sometimes used as a synonym for an
identical disclosure or description of § 102, but sometimes not. In Wilden
Pump & Eng'r v. Pressed & Welded Prods., 199 U.S.P.Q. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
the court used it in the anticipatory sense stating: "Anticipation is strictly a
technical defense. Unless all of the same elements are found in exactly the
same situation and united in the same way to perform the identical function, there is no anticipation." Id. at 399; accord, Hancock Labs. v. American
Hosp. Supply, 199 U.S.P.Q. 274 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (method of preparing pig
heart valves for use in human transplants anticipated by identical method
for preparing pig heart valves for pathalogical study). Contra, Chemetron
Corp. v. Airco, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 119 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (method of removing
drainage from a patient not anticipated by apparently identical method for
doing the same with cadavers; summary judgment denied).
88. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 133 U.S.P.Q. 365 (C.C.P.A. 1962). For a
discussion on enablement see notes 190-204 infra.
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ever, a subsequent auxiliary reference (also prior art) suggested
how to make the compound.8 9 The court allowed the combination because the subject matter was in possession of the public
more than one year prior to the applicant's filing date. 90
Two cases from the same court 9 ' illustrate the difficulty in
determining when an invention is completely described in the
prior art. In each case, the respective inventors had practiced a
method that was apparently operationally identical to the prior
art. Each had sought to distinguish from the prior art by reason
of functional claim limitations.
The first case was In re May. 92 The claims were to "a
method of effecting analgesic and morphine antagonistic activity
without producing physical dependence in animals which com-

prises administering [a certain compound]. '' 93 The prior art
showed one of the claimed compounds as being a useful analgesic, but had neither taught nor suggested the "without producing physical dependence" 94 limitation. The court held that
"[w~hile the references do not show a specific recognition of
that result, its discovery by appellant is tantamount only to finding a property in the old composition, not in the ... compound

for which it is argued, a new use has been found.195 In other
words, the "without producing physical dependence" limitation
could not "serve to patentably distinguish the claimed process
'96
from the prior art.
In In re Marshall,97 the claimed method was to "a weight
control process which comprises ...

periodically anesthetizing

the nerve endings in the digestive tract [by administering a certain anesthetic] ."98 That same material had been used for the
treatment of ulcers. In contrast to May, the claims were allowed, as the court held:
These claims are directed to a weight control process. Applicant
89. In re Samour, 571 F.2d at 562-63, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 4 (§ 102 rejection was

affirmed).
90. The Samour court rejected the contention that one skilled in the art
needed an incentive to make the compound before references to the same
subject matter could be combined. Id. at 563, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 4.
91. Compare In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 197 U.S.P.Q. 601 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
and In re Tomlinson, 363 F.2d 928, 150 U.S.P.Q. 623 (C.C.P.A. 1966) with In re
Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 198 U.S.P.Q. 344 (C.C.P.A. 1978) and Chemetron
Corp. v. Airco, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 119 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
92. 574 F.2d 1082, 197 U.S.P.Q. 601 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
93. Id. at 1084, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 602 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 1087, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 604.
95. Id. at 1090, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 607; see In re Tomlinson, 363 F.2d 928, 150
U.S.P.Q. 623 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
96. In re May, 574 F.2d at 1090, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 607.
97. 578 F.2d 301, 198 U.S.P.Q. 344 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
98. Id. at 302, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 345.
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uses an effective amount of the anesthetic . . . in order to control
weight. The [prior art], however, teaches using drugs containing
the anesthetic . . . in order to treat [certain syndromes such as
peptic ulcer]. Nothing in the [prior art] remotely suggests taking
[the anesthetic] to lose weight. If anyone ever lost weight by fo]lowing the [prior art] teachings, it was an unrecognized accident.
duplication of an invention cannot conAn accidental or unwitting
99
stitute an anticipation.
2.

Described in a Printed Publication

Important law was made, or at least restated by three cases,
in connection with "described in a printed publication" under
section 102(a) and/or section 102(b).10 0
In In re Samour,10 1 discussed previously, the court held that
a publication that described a prior art compound, but which
failed to both describe a method of preparation and to disclose
the effects on people became an "enabling" and anticipatory
description in a publication when another reference, also prior
art, suggested how to make the compound in question. The public was in possession of the invention when the secondary reference was later published. Thus, even though persons skilled in
the art had no incentive to "combine" the two references, the
critical issue remained: did the public have possession of the
subject matter more than one year prior to the applicant's filing
02
date?
The second case, In re Bayer, 0 3 decided the specific issue of
when a library thesis became a "printed publication." Was it
when the thesis was placed in the library, or when it was catalogued and shelved? Holding that only the latter events qualified the thesis as a "publication," the court allowed the claims.
The court began its decision stating:
It is well settled that in determining whether a printed document constitutes a publication bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(c), the
touchstone is public accessibility. This follows logically from the
theory that the patent grant is in the nature of a contract between
the inventor and the public. Access of knowledge of the invention
is already accessible to the public, there is a failure of considera99. Id. at 304, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 346; In re Felton, 484 F.2d 495, 179 U.S.P.Q.
295 (C.C.P.A. 1973), Chemetron Corp. v. Airco, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 119 (N.D. Ill.
1976) (method of removing drainage from a patient not anticipated by apparently identical method for doing the same with cadavers).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(b) (1976). Section 102(b) provides in relevant
part, "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication ... or in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application ...
"; see note 85 supra for the language of § 102(a).
101. 571 F.2d 559, 197 U.S.P.Q. 1 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
102, Id. at 562, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 4.
103. 568 F.2d 1357, 196 U.S.P.Q. 670 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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tion and no patent may be granted.' 0 4
It then concluded:
We think it is apparent that a printed document may qualify as a
"publication" under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), notwithstanding that accessibility thereto is restricted to a "part of the public," so long as accessibility is sufficient 'to raise a presumption that the public
concerned with the art would know of [the invention]. . . Accessibility to appellant's thesis by the three members of the graduate
committee under the circumstances of the present case does not
raise such a presumption.
Moreover, since appellant's thesis could have been located in
the university library only by one having been informed of its existence by the faculty committee, and not by means of the customary
research aids available in the library, the "probability of public
10 5
knowledge of the contents of the [thesis]," was virtually nil.
The third case was In re Schaumann.10 6 Schaumann decided the recurrent question of whether, when, and if a generic
description is a specific disclosure of each member of the genus.
As stated by the unsuccessful appellant, the issue was "whether
the disclosure of a chemical genus may ever constitute a
description of a specific compound falling within the ambit of
10 7
the genus.'
The plaintiff contended and asked the court to hold that In
10 9
re Ruschig'0 8 overruled its prior decision of In re Petering.
Petering had held that a generic class of some twenty compounds was a specific disclosure or description of each member
of the class "as fully as if he had drawn each structural formula
or had written each name. . . -110 But Petering, or at least the

generalization from Petering, had been condemned in In re Ruschig. The Ruschig court held:
We did not intend our Peteringopinion or decision to become a precedent for the mechanistic dissection and recombination of the
components of the specific illustrative compounds in every chemical reference containing them, to create hindsight anticipation with
the guidance of an applicant's disclosure, on the theory that such
reconstructed disclosures describe specific compounds within the
104. Id. at 1358, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 671; In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 117
U.S.P.Q. 348 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (single microfilm copy not a printed publication).
105. In re Bayer, 568 F.2d at 1361, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 674; In re Tenney, 254
F.2d 619, 117 U.S.P.Q. 348 (C.C.P.A. 1958); see Camp Bros. v. Portable Wagon
Dump & Elevator Co., 251 F. 603 (7th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 572
(1918).
106. 572 F.2d 312, 197 U.S.P.Q. 5 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
107. Id. at 315, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 7.
108. 343 F.2d 965, 145 U.S.P.Q. 274 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
109. 301 F.2d 676, 133 U.S.P.Q. 275 (C.C.P.A. 1962), overruledby, In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 486, 172 U.S.P.Q. 524 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965,
145 U.S.P.Q. 275 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
110. In re Petering, 301 F.2d at 682, 133 U.S.P.Q. at 280.
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meaning of § 102. . . . To do this, the board selects [different radicals] to create, ex-post-facto four undisclosed specific compounds
out of a possible 259, according to appellants' apparently valid calculation. This is not the kind of description we found in Petering
111
and we do not find here any "anticipation".
Schaumann had involved a genus of fourteen compounds in
the prior art. Actually, the genus was broader, but the CCPA
considered the claims of the prior art reference to focus on the
fourteen compounds. It stated:
When we consider [these factors, the prior art] embraces a
very limited number of compounds closely related to one another
in structure, we are led inevitably to the conclusion that the reference provides a description of those compounds just as surely as if
they were identified in the reference by name. Since one of the
compounds thus described is [being claimed by the appellant] we
agree with the examiner and the majority of the board that appellants' right to a patent thereon is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).112
3.

In Public Use or on Sale

This year, the usual controversies have developed as to
whether an alleged incident of public use or "on sale" is commercial and hence invalidating, or experimental and therefore
not. The courts also confronted the issue of whether the invention must be "on hand" (i.e., available for delivery) before there
113
can be an "on sale"?
Bird Provision Co. v. Owens Country Sausage, Inc.114 affirmed the invalidity of claims which were found to be. anticipated by four instances of prior use. Summarizing, the court
stated:
The bar to patent validity thrown up by § 102(b) is basically a
reflection of the public policy that an inventor should not be permitted to extend the effective duration of his patent monopoly
through covert commercial exploitation of his invention. [citation
omitted] Thus, a public use may be established either by showing a
nonsecret, nonexperimental use of the process or showing that the
inventor himself used the process primarily for trade and profit
111. In re Rushig, 343 F.2d at 974, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 282 (emphasis supplied);
see In re Ruschig (II), 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. 118 (C.C.P.A. 1967), where
the court held: "Surely, given time, a chemist could name (especially with
the aid of a computer) all of the half million compounds within the scope of
the broadest claims, which claim is supported by the broad disclosure. This
does not constitute support for each compound individually when separately claimed." Id. at 994, 154 U.S.P.Q. at 122; accord,In re Wertheim, 541
F.2d 257, 191 U.S.P.Q. 90 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Waymouth, 499 F.2d 1273, 182
U.S.P.Q. 290 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Smith, 458 F.2d 1389, 173 U.S.P.Q. 679
(C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Wagner, 371 F.2d 877, 152 U.S.P.Q. 552 (C.C.P.A. 1967);
see Hunt v. Treppschuh, 523 F.2d 1386, 187 U.S.P.Q. 426 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
112. In re Schaumann, 572 F.2d at 316, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 8.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
114. 568 F.2d 369, 197 U.S.P.Q. 134 (5th Cir. 1978).
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prior1 15to the critical date, regardless of whether his use was secret.
The Fifth Circuit also considered public use aspects under section 102(a), finding that the "process has been used on American
116
farms for generations."
The same court, in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs,
Inc.," 7 sustained the validity of a patent over the contention
that the inventor had sold springs made from his patented die
more than a year before the fling date. The trial court had
found that his primary intention was experimental, and the sale
only incidental.
While both the majority and the dissent in Gould, Inc. v.
United States"8 relied on the same cases, they reached opposite
conclusions. The issue was whether the inventor had placed his
torpedo engine on sale by offering arguably experimental quantities to the Navy more than a year before his filing date. The
Navy wanted a liquid-propelled engine, but the experiments (or
sales) were for solid propellant systems. The majority, citing
and discussing a number of cases where an "on sale" had occurred by offering limited quantities to potentially commercial
customers, held that the activities amounted to a commercialization of the invention." 9 Even where the patentee did not have
115. Id. at 372, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 137; accord,In re Yarn Proc. Patent ValidIt Lit., 498 F.2d 271, 183 U.S.P.Q. 65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1057
X174).
116. Bird Prov. Co. v. Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d at 372, 197
U.S.P.Q. at 137.
117. 569 F.2d 286, 197 U.S.P.Q. 273 (5th Cir. 1978); cf. March v. United
States, 568 F.2d 722, 198 U.S.P.Q. 456 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (although held invalid for
obviousness, an anticipation was avoided notwithstanding possible incidental and occasional practice of the system in episodic instances of extraordinary rainfall).
118. 579 F.2d 571, 198 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Ct. Cl. 1978). In Gould, Inc., the majority and the dissent relied on Judge Thornberry's liberal decision of In re
Yarn Proc. Patent Validity Lit., 498 F.2d 271, 183 U.S.P.Q. 65 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 419 U.S. 1057 (1974).

119. 579 F.2d at 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 164. The court relied on Judge
Wright's observations in Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 815,
131 U.S.P.Q. 413, 429 (D. Del. 1961), where the court stated:
The in public use or on sale rules as applied to the independent craftsman who constructs a product to order for instance, may lead to absurd
results when applied to an integrated, mass production industry with
highly organized merchandising systems. The question of what is experimentation and what is not may also take on a different complexion
depending on the character of the device, the nature of the industry and
the facilities available to the particular inventor.
See Metallizing Eng'r Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516,
68 U.S.P.Q. 54 (2d Cir. 1946) (balance of inventor's interest and those of the
public); cf. Diet v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 576, 123 U.S.P.Q. 21 (S.D. Cal.
1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 693, 127 U.S.P.Q. 410 (9th Cir. 1960) (sale more than one
year prior to application held to violate 102(b) even though for secret military contract); Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v. Columbus Fiber Mills Co., 165 F.
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the capability to manufacture any commercial quantity at that
time, some courts have held the patents invalid under section
102(b).120
However, to show the gross incompatibility of the decisions,
one should consider those cases where the courts have validated
the patents even though the purported experiment greatly resembled a commercial display. 121 In Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 2 2 the court sustained a patent even though the
inventor had sent letters to a magazine columnist advising that
the device was available at a price. The court held this not to be
an "on sale," as neither the columnist nor the magazine were
likely to be purchasers. 123 As in several other cases, the court
held that an inventor can exercise his judgment in not disclosing
experimental uses or "on sales" to the PTO. 124 Finally, it seems
clear that a visible, operative, experimental prototype of an in125
vention, without more, is not a public use by the inventor.
Supp. 307, 118 U.S.P.Q. 53 (M.D. Ga. 1958) (showing samples to auto manufacturer). But see Gould, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d at 584, 198 U.S.P.Q.
at 168 (Nichols, J., dissenting) where he stated:
Judge Thornberry's analysis of the case reveals a dismaying state of
conflict and confusion. We Massachusetts lawyers used to say that
some decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of the state could be
cited on the wrong side of every issue, and so it is with the Federal
cases in this area of Section 102(b). I cannot help seeing, as he does,
some instances of almost willful laying of traps for the unwary. It may
be we of the judiciary have an unconscious hostility towards the patent
system. Our lives would certainly be easier if it did not exist. I know
such motives are not at work in the majority decision here, but I cannot
help thinking that, without so intending, the trial judge is adding another quagmire (as he calls it) to the many already lurking in the jungle. I would have preferred to clear out underbrush and open up solid
land.
Id. at 586, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 169.
120. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Certain Teed Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. 152 (C.D.
Cal. 1977) (stating that on-hand rule is outmoded); see Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 595 F.2d 979, 201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir. 1978) (hundred-plus page decision on a plethora of issues involving 22 patents in 37 different law suits); cf.
Gould, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 198 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (offer of experimental quantities to the navy).
121. Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 197 U.S.P.Q. 83 (D.N.D. 1976), modified,
570 F.2d 778, 197 U.S.P.Q. 209 (8th Cir. 1977) (own prototypes held experimental despite apparent commercial display).
122. 457 F. Supp. 213, 199 U.S.P.Q. 269 (D. Minn. 1978).
123. Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 457 F. Supp. at 220, 199 U.S.P.Q.
at 278 (D. Minn. 1978) (there were no publications of the magazine prior to
the critical date).
124. Nortin, Inc. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1072, 199
U.S.P.Q. 57 (D. Colo. 1978); cf. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
457 F. Supp. 482, 198 U.S.P.Q. 529 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (experimental, incomplete, long forgotten and abandoned); Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Co.,
446 F. Supp. 1056, 199 U.S.P.Q. 401 (E.D. Neb. 1978) (visible operative, experimental prototype of a circular irrigation system).
125. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 1056, 199
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"Patented"Under Sections 102(a), 102(b) and 102(d)

Until the end of this year, the term "patented" in section 102
has had different meanings in section 102(a)1 26 and section
102(b) 127 than it does in section 102(d). 128 Under section 102(a)
and section 102(b), "patented" usually means both accessibility
to the public and the commencement of an enforceable legal
right. Under section 102 (d), accessibility is not a factor and only
129
the acquisition of a right is germane.
In the United States, there is usually no problem as to when
a patent becomes "patented," as the patent is both accessible to
the public and marks the onset of legal rights on the same
day.' 30 In foreign countries with different patent systems, public accessibility may occur either before, simultaneously with, or
3
after the acquisition of an enforceable right.' '
Therefore, the different meanings of the term "patented"
was an issue in several cases this past year. In Steelcase, Inc. v.
Delwood Furniture Co.,132 the invalidity of utility and design
patents on what was "perhaps the most successful [chair]
model ever offered on the American market" was affirmed on art
contained in a Belgian patent. The court held that foreign patents are to be treated for purposes of section 103 as domestic
patents. Therefore, "there is no reason,. . . to restrict the examination of foreign patents to their explicit claims and ignore
U.S.P.Q. 401 (E.D. Neb. 1978) (the patent was, however, held invalid under
§ 103 as representing "conventional engineering practice").
126. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976) provides in relevant part: "[T]he invention
was . . .patented . . .in this or a foreign country before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent."
127. Id. § 102(b) provides in relevant part: "[Tlhe invention was patented ...in this or a foreign country ...more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States."
128. Id. § 102(d) provides in relevant part: "[Tlhe invention was first
patented or caused to be patented ... by the applicant or his legal representative or assigned in a foreign country prior to the date of the application
for patents in this or on an application ...held more than twelve months
before the filing of the application in the United States"; see Duplan v. Deering Milliken Res. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 826, 177 U.S.P.Q. 515 (D.S.C. 1973), affd,
487 F.2d 459, 179 U.S.P.Q. 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1973).
129. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (1976) with 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)

(1976).

130. See Hefter, The Questionable Status of Those U.S. Patents Bearing
Issue DatesBetween March 7, 1978 and September 5, 1978-Nationaland InternationalRamifications of United States PatentPrintingDelay, 60 J. PAT.

Soc'y 685 (1978), where the author deals with the short period in this
country when patent printing was delayed, and accordingly we followed the
OFF.

"foreign" system of granting legal rights before the document itself was ac-

cessible.
131. See note 132 infra.
132. 578 F.2d 74, 199 U.S.P.Q. 69 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960,
201 U.S.P.Q. 640 (1979).
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33
what can be inferred from the claim."'
34
In Exparte Fujishiro,1
the board held that a Japanese utility model patent does not become "patented" for purposes of
section 102(d) when it is laid open for public inspection, but
rather when it is afterwards published. The first event, the court
held, does not create enforceable rights.
Further illustrating the different definitions of "patent" was
Exparte Appeal No. 242-47.135 Therein, the "De'livre'" date of a
French patent was held to create a section 102(d) bar. The
board expressly distinguished this from the different situation
under section 102(a) or section 102(b). Interestingly, once the
board reached this conclusion, it held that the patent became
prior art under 35 U.S.C. section 103.136

But then came In re Monks 137 which involved the question
of when a British patent became "patented" under section
102(d). The British specification was published before the
United States filing date but was "sealed" subsequently. Under
British practice, infringement damages are backdated to the
date of publication.
Examining the history of section 102(d) specifically and section 102 in general, the court held that "patented" should mean
the same throughout section 102. That is, "patented" meant the
granting or issuance of a legal right, and this occurred when the
138
patent was sealed.
5.

Made in This Country by Another Who Has Not
Abandoned, Suppressed, or Concealed It
Under 35 U.S.C. section 102(g), 13 9 a patent is not obtainable

133. Id. at 77, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 73.
134. 199 U.S.P.Q. 36 (Bd. App. 1977) (Japanese utility model).
135. 196 U.S.P.Q. 828 (Bd. App. 1976).
136. Contra, In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(holding that certain portions of § 102 placed matter in the public domain
for the purpose of being "prior art" for § 103, but included § 102(d) as a "loss
of rights" section rather than as a "prior art," or novelty section). According
to Bass, an applicant could obtain a valid U.S. patent on an "obvious" modification of a § 102(d) reference. See also Lee Pharma'l v. Kreps, Sec'y of
Commerce, 577 F.2d 610, 198 U.S.P.Q. 601 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1073, 200 U.S.P.Q. 832 (1979), where an effort under the Freedom of Information Act to gain access to abandoned patent application files was
thwarted. The court held that abandoned applications must be maintained
insecrecy.
137. 588 F.2d 308, 200 U.S.P.Q. 129 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
138. Id. at 310, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 129: "the distinction ... make[s] no sense
from a policy standpoint."
139. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (g) before the applicant's
invention . .. [it] was made in this country by another who had not
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if "before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was
made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it." In ContinentalCopper & Steel Industries v. New York Wire Co., 140 the contested patent was held
invalid based on the prior invention of another who had not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed his invention. Once the
defendant had shown that the invention was previously made
by another, "the force of the statutory presumption of validity of
a patent fades, thereby shifting the burden to the patent holder
to establish that the first inventor abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed his invention. '141 "Abandonment" was not proved by
showing that the other had abandoned his own patent applica142
tion subsequent to the present inventor's date.
6.

Miscellaneous PriorArt Cases

In Rohm & Haas Co. v. Owens-Corning FiberglassCorp.,143
the court confirmed the rule that, under section 102 (e), where an
earlier filed application is relied upon as prior art, and that application is a continuation-in-part of a still-earlier one, only the
teachings contained in the first application and carried over into
the continuation-in-part are prior art as of the first application
filing date. In other words, even though an invention is disclosed in an application, unless a patent issues which describes
the invention of the first application, the first application is not a
section 102(e) reference even though it is in fact accessible to
the public. 14
What the sections on prior art seem to suggest is that when
a court wants to hold a patent invalid, it will find a way. Having
one's patents previously held valid in prior litigation, 145 and
even being awarded a Nobel Prize for one's discoveries, does not
abandoned, suppressed or concealed it. In determining priority ...
there shall be considered ... the respective dates of conception and
reduction to practice ... the reasonable diligence of one who was first
to conceive ... [and] and last to reduce to practice.
140. 196 U.S.P.Q. 30 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
141. Id. at 36; accord, Allen v. Brady Co., 508 F.2d 64, 184 U.S.P.Q. 385 (7th
Cir. 1954).
142. Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. New York Wire Co., 196
U.S.P.Q. at 35.
143. 196 U.S.P.Q. 726 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
144. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1977) provides: "[Tihe invention was described

in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the
United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent."

145. See Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 171 U.S.P.Q. 44 (N.D. Tex.
1971), modified, 483 F.2d 858, 177 U.S.P.Q. 481 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414

U.S. 1079, 180 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1973).
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help when a court really wants to hold a patent invalid. 146 Nor
does the fact that the court, to do this, holds as prior art the forcontrary to what has
eign priority date of a foreign inventor,
147
long been regarded as settled law.
An example of this was illustrated in Studiengesellschaft
Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co. 14 8 There the invention by
Professor Karl Ziegler was a certain catalyst system for
polymerizing olefins, especially ethylene, to solid polymers. He
disclosed the system to an Italian scientist, Dr. Natta, who first
used it successfully for polymerizing another olefin, propylene.
Natta then filed his own patent application. Other courts had
held that prior foreign applications of a party are not prior art as
to a United States application. 149 However, this court construed
Ziegler's United States patents as attempting to cover Natta's
invention. The court found there was no reference in Ziegler's
United States applications to Natta's priority as to propylyene
50
and held that Natta's foreign applications were prior art.
D. 35 U.S.C. Section 103-Patentabilityof Structurally
Obvious Chemical Compounds
One important case dealt with the question of whether
structurally obvious chemical compounds can be patented as
new compositions of matter on the basis of their having non-obvious properties, if they also have properties which are obvious. 151 The case, In re May,152 has done much to reconcile some
apparently conflicting authorities. A chronological approach to
the issue is probably most helpful.
146. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 197
U.S.P.Q. 164 (E.D. Tex. 1977).
147. See Eli Lilly &Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599, 153 U.S.P.Q. 95 (D.C. Cir.
1967), rev'g 248 F. Supp. 402, 147 U.S.P.Q. 442 (D.D.C. 1965); In re Hillmer, 359

F.2d 859, 149 U.S.P.Q. 480 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (not prior art under § 102(e)); cf.In
re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 165 U.S.P.Q. 255 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (not prior art under
§ 102(g)).
148. 197 U.S.P.Q. 164 (E.D. Tex. 1977).
149. See Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. W.A. Shaeffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp.
849, 153 U.S.P.Q. 499 (D. Del. 1967). See also note 147 and accompanying text
supra.
150. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 197 U.S.P.Q.
at 175.

151. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 ... if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the

art
....
152. 574

F.2d 1082, 197 U.S.P.Q. 601 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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In the three In re Hass153 cases of 1944, the CCPA had held
that "in order to be patentable, novel members of a homologous
series of chemical compounds must possess some un-obvious or
unexpected beneficial properties not possessed by a homologous
compound disclosed in the prior art." This was repeated in the
1950 case of In re Henze, 54 where the court said:
The burden is on the applicant to rebut that presumption [of patentability of structurally related chemical compounds] by a showing that the claimed compound possesses unobvious or unexpected
beneficial properties not actually possessed by the prior art homolog. It is immaterial that the prior art homolog may not be recognized or known to be useful for the same purpose
or to possess the
5
same properties as the claimed compound.'
And this remained the law for some nineteen years.
56
Departure from Haas-Henze was presaged by In re Ruff.
The actual holding in Ruff was that one's own teachings of
equivalency was not an admission that equivalency was obvious. The rationale of Ruff was broader. "Prior art" meant only
what the art itself taught or suggested, not what it taught or suggested after an applicant's disclosure is available.
15 7
Expanding upon this rationale, the court in In re Papesch
reversed the board's decision which had relied on the HaasHenze precedents. Furthermore, in contrast to Haas-Henze,
where the prior art compound had no disclosed utility, the applicant in Papesch demonstrated that the prior art did not in fact
have the pharmaceutical property asserted for the new materials. An augmented board held this evidence irrelevant. This
holding was reversed, as "the subject matter as a whole" in section 103 requires consideration of composition and properties:
Returning now to the decision of the board in this case, we
think that it rests on one fundamental error of law, namely, the failure to take into consideration the biological or pharmaceutical
property of the compounds as anti-inflammatory agents on the
grounds that to chemists the structure of the compounds would be
so obvious as to be beyond doubt, and that a showing of such
properties is to be used only to resolve doubt.
From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its
properties are inseparable; they are one and the same thing. The
graphic formulae, the chemical nomenclature, the systems of classification and studies such as concepts of homology, isomerism,
etc., are mere symbols by which compounds can be identified, classified, and compared. But a formula is not a compound and while it
153. In re Hass, 141 F.2d 130, 60 U.S.P.Q. 552 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In re Hass,
141 F.2d 127, 60 U.S.P.Q. 548 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122, 60
U.S.P.Q. 544 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
154. 181 F.2d 196, 85 U.S.P.Q. 261 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
155. Id. at 201, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 267 (emphasis added).
156. 256 F.2d 590, 118 U.S.P.Q. 340 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
157. 315 F.2d 381, 137 U.S:P.Q. 42 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
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may serve in a claim to identify what is being patented, as the
metes and bounds of a deed identify a plot of land, the thing that is
patented is not the formula but the compound identified by it. And
the patentability of the thing does not depend on the similarity of
its formula to that of another compound but on the similarity of the
former compound to the latter. There is no basis in law for ignoring
any property in making such a comparison. An assumed similarity
must give way evidence that the
formulae
based on a comparison of 15
8
assumption is erroneous.
In short, "obviousness of the compound. . . is realistically and
15 9
legally, a composite of both structure and properties.'
Shortly thereafter, the courts began to carve out exceptions
to the Papesch rule. 160 The courts held that where the prior art
compounds were known to have certain properties, the discovery of a new property for a structurally obvious new compound
required affirmative proof that the new property was absent (or,
16 1
at least, not present to the same degree) in the old materials.
However, the Haas-Henze precedent, and those cases explaining
it, were limited or overruled in In re Stemniski. 162 In Stemniski,
the prior art compounds, which made the claimed ones structurally obvious, had no known or obvious utility. Under these circumstances, the court held that the discovery of any nonobvious
utility in the novel compounds (irrespective of whether the old
compounds in fact had the same utility) made the new compounds patentable. It asked the rhetorical question, among
others:
[Wihy should it be said that a reference makes obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art an isomer, homolog or analog of related
158. Id. at 391, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 51.
159. Id. at 392, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 52; accord,In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 145
U.S.P.Q. 274 (C.C.P.A. 1965); see Commissioner v. Deutsche Gold, 397 F.2d
656, 157 U.S.P.Q. 549 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger quoted with approval "the sound reasoning of the Papesch case." But
see In re Riden, 318 F.2d 761, 138 U.S.P.Q. 112 (C.C.P.A. 1963), where the
court returned to the Haas-Henze rule stating, "It is true that [the prior art]
does not teach that the compounds have insecticide properties, but that
there is no showing that they don't."
160. See, e.g., In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 166 U.S.P.Q. 406 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In
re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055, 161 U.S.P.Q. 281 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re DeMontmollin,
344 F.2d 976, 145 U.S.P.Q. 416 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
161. In re DeMontmollin, 344 F.2d at 979, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 424, where the
court reasoned "under the circumstances and weighing the available evidence, we do not regard the additional ability to dye cotton sufficient to
render the subject matter as a whole unobvious."
162. 444 F.2d 581, 170 U.S.P.Q. 343 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Those cases which limited Papesch were distinguished and limited. See cases cited in note 152
supra. Focusing on In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055, 161 U.S.P.Q. 281 (C.C.P.A.
1969), the court, which had distinguished Papesch, said that in that case
"the primary reference also disclosed a significant utility for the prescribed
compounds," 444 F.2d at 585, 170 U.S.P.Q. at 346 (emphasis in original),
which one of ordinary skill would consider the structurally closely-related
compounds of the claims to likewise possess.
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structure, when that mythical, but intensely practical, person
knows of no "practical" reason to make the reference
compound,
163
much less any structurally related compounds?
The court concluded that since Henze had been "honored as
much in its breach as in its observance,' 64 and was illogical,
Henze and Riden, "to the extent that [they] are inconsistent
with the views expressed herein, they no longer will be followed
and are overruled."' 165 Stemniski, however, was not immediately
166
accepted by the other circuits or lower courts.
But in In re Albrecht,167 the CCPA reaffirmed Stemniski. Albrecht involved the issue of "whether a novel chemical compound is unobvious. . . if it is discovered. . . to have a new and
advantageous property not possessed by a prior art compound,
notwithstanding the fact that it may possess a property known
to be possessed by the known compound."' 68 There the prior art
compound was disclosed as being "only faintly active" as an anesthetic and was irritating. The new compounds had antiviral
activity, which was shown to be absent in the prior art compounds. Since the prior art compounds "cannot be regarded as
useful" for the sole use disclosed (i.e., as an anesthetic), "a person having ordinary skill in the art would lack the 'necessary
impetus' to make the claimed compounds."' 69 The court concluded that "a newly discovered activity of a claimed novel compound which bears no material relationship to the activity
disclosed for the prior art analogs is further evidence, not to be
70
ignored, of the nonobviousness of the claimed invention."'
In 1977, two cases from the CCPA retreated somewhat from
Stemniski and Albrecht, not only by reason of their holdings but
also because neither decision cited either Stemniski or Albrecht.171 In In re Wilder,172 the applicant claimed, as a new
composition of matter, a novel chemical compound which was
163. In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d at 586, 170 U.S.P.Q. at 347.
164. Id. at 587, 170 U.S.P.Q. at 348.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Brown v. Gottschalk, 484 F.2d 813, 179 U.S.P.Q. 65 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edward Pharma'l Corp., 341 F. Supp.
1303, 173 U.S.P.Q. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. CarterWallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 176 U.S.P.Q. 2 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 929 (1972).
167. 514 F.2d 1389, 185 U.S.P.Q. 585 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
168. Id. at 1394, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 588.
169. Id. at 1396, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 590. In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055, 161 U.S.P.Q.
281 (C.C.P.A. 1969), was distinguished because "the common property of
the prior art compound was a specific significant property." 514 F.2d at 1396,
185 U.S.P.Q. at 590.
170. 514 F.2d at 1396, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 590.
171. E.g., In re Shette, 566 F.2d 81, 195 U.S.P.Q. 753 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Rich,
J.); In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457, 195 U.S.P.Q. 426 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Baldwin, J.).
172. 563 F.2d 457, 195 U.S.P.Q. 426 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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the homologue of one prior art compound and the isomer of another. Wilder had discovered that his compound was an inhibitor for rubber and was nontoxic. The prior art compounds were
taught as gasoline stabilizers, and the art said nothing about
their toxicity. The fact that the applicant, Wilder, had discovered the property of nontoxicity was unavailing. It turned out
that both of the prior art compounds were effective rubber inhibitors, and one was nontoxic. The court held:
Although appellant's evidence shows a substantial difference in
skin toxicity between the claimed compound and the isomer, the
evidence does not point out a single actual difference in properties
between the claimed compound and the homologue. Wilder's discovery of the absence of skin toxicity in the claimed compound
does not end the inquiry, because one who claims a compound, per
se, which is structurally similar to a prior art compound must rebut
the presumed expectation that the structurally similar compounds
have similar properties .... Appellant has shown no actual differ-

ence in properties between the two compounds or any other evidence sufficient to rebut that expectation.
Because the expectation of similar properties stands unrebutted, it necessarily follows that an expectation of similar uses also
stands unrebutted. This expectation of similar uses necessarily implies an expectation that the claimed compound would have been a
substantially equivalent substitute for the prior art gasoline antidegradant and this expectation stands rebutted. Since this expectation of equivalency for the prior art use stands, we must conclude
that it would have been obvious to use the claimed compound as a
gasoline antidegradant ....173
The second case, In re Shette, 174 affirmed a board decision as
to a composition claim but reversed as to the method claims. In
Shette, the invention was to a class of compounds useful in curbing the appetites of animals, and the prior art had disclosed a
similar (structurally obvious) class "to combat microbial infestation. 17 5 The court held:
Confronted with PTO evidence of obviousness, appellant has
offered no evidence of unobviousness, as by showing an actual difference in properties between his compounds and the prior art
compounds ....

Appellant merely shows that his novel com-

pounds are appetite suppressants, whereas the reference compounds are not so known. Further, appellant has not indicated
whether his compounds are antiviral, as is [the] prior art compound. Presented with such an absence of comparative or other
evidence with respect to the properties of the compounds and the
claimed composition, we hold that composition claim 52 would have
173. Id. at 460-61, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 429-30 (citations omitted); see In re
Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 166 U.S.P.Q. 406 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mod, 408 F.2d
1055, 161 U.S.P.Q. 281 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
174. In re Shette, 566 F.2d 81, 195 U.S.P.Q. 753 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
175. Id. at 86, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 756.
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176
been obvious from and unpatentable over the prior art.

But as to the method claims, the courts directed their allowance
even though the dosages of the prior art and of the claims were
the same:
The Patent Office has failed to show a reasonable expectation, or
some predictability, that [the prior art] compound would be an effective appetite suppressant if administered in the dosage disclosed by [another reference]. The mere hindsight assertion that
corresponding dosages render appellant's method obvious is untenable ....
That which may be inherent is not necessarily
known.
177
Obviousness cannot be predicated on what is unknown.

In re May, 178 decided this past year, reversed the rejection
of composition claims and held that even though one property of
the new compound, analgesic (pain-relieving) capability, was
obvious, another property, nonaddictiveness, was not obvious.
Evidence in the case included an impressive showing that analgesic properties were not difficult to attain, but nonaddictiveness was a desideratum that was the long-sought goal of
pharmaceutical researchers. As to these showings, the court observed:
[There is] uncontroverted evidence that the raison d'etre for research for those skilled in this art was, and still is, not simply to
produce another analgesic compound, but to produce one which
would exert this therapeutic value while at the same time being
nonaddictive. This, in our view, diminishes the significance that
should be attached to the expected beneficial result of potent analgesic, i.e., it diminishes its evidentiary value that one skilled in the
art would have been motivated to make appellants' compounds and
to use them to effect analgesia, and enhances the significance that
should be attached to appellants' unexpected result of nonaddictive, potent analgesic, i.e., it enhances179
its evidentiary value as an
objective indicium of nonobviousness.
When considering the composition claims, the court emphasized
that these were admittedly novel compounds.
The board had stated "that since the property of analgesic
activity would have been expected, the fact that the prior art did
not recognize another advantageous property (viz., nonaddictiveness) does not diminish the teaching of analgesic activ176. Id. (citation omitted); see In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1391, 166 U.S.P.Q. 406
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
177. In re Shette, 566 F.2d at 87, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 757; see In re Sporman, 363
F.2d 444, 150 U.S.P.Q. 449 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (production of sulfites without producing sulfates); In re Adams, 356 F.2d 998, 148 U.S.P.Q. 742 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
(rejection based on obviousness of no splash water aerators reversed; "The
inherency of an advantage and obviousness are entirely different questions." 363 F.2d at 448, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 452).
178. 574 F.2d 1082, 197 U.S.P.Q. 601 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
179. Id. at 1093, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 610; see In re Labatino, 387 F.2d 981, 156
U.S.P.Q. 212 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (also an analysis compound claim).
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ity."'180 The CCPA, on the authority of Albrecht, disagreed as a
matter of law. It said:
Thus, merely because those skilled in the art would have expected the compounds of Claim 11 to have analgesic activity, does
not mean, as the board apparently suggests, that an irrebuttable
presumption of obviousness has been established. Those properties which would have been expected must be balanced against the
unexpected property. 1' 1
The court distinguished the Wilder case on the facts and on the
basis of an "implicit" assumption that had there been sufficient
evidence in Wilder, the decision might have gone otherwise.
While there was an attempt to reconcile May with Albrecht
and Wilder, the core issue was decided differently in May and
Albrecht than in Wilder. In all three cases, and at least minimally in Stemniski and Shette, there was one obvious property
and one nonobvious one. In all the cases, the applicant was unable to show that the nonobvious property was in fact absent in
the prior art compound. Yet in May, Stemniski and Albrecht,
the claims were allowed, while in Wilder and Shette they were
not. 182
E.

35 U.S.C. Section 112-Specification and Claims

Title 35 U.S.C. section 112,183 which defines the requirements of the specification and its claims, continued to be the
source of lively and inconsistent decisions. Curiously, the focus
seems to be changing. In 1976, there was a disproportionately
large number of "best mode" cases under section 112;184 in 1977,
185
the "description" requirement received the most attention;
but in 1978, several cases revived the "old combination" rejection, although there is uncertainty as to whether the rejection
186
itself is proper under the statute.
180. In re May, 574 F.2d at 1093, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 610.
181. Id. (emphasis in original) (the court failed to mention In re Shette);
see In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 185 U.S.P.Q. 585 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
182. Compare In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 197 U.S.P.Q. 601 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In
re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 185 U.S.P.Q 585 (C.C.P.A. 1975) and In re
Stemniski, 444 F.2d 581, 170 U.S.P.Q. 343 (C.C.P.A. 1971) with In re Shette,
566 F.2d 81, 195 U.S.P.Q. 753 (C.C.P.A. 1977) and In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457,
195 U.S.P.Q. 426 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) provides in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it in such full, clear,

concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the act to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the

inventor of carrying out his invention.

184. See notes 209-22 and accompanying text infra.

185. See notes 179-93 and accompanying text infra.
186. See notes 231-48 and accompanying text infra.
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Description

The "description" requirement of section 112 stems from the
187
statutory language "a written description of the invention,"'
and means a written description in the specification commensurate in scope or breadth with the entire invention being
claimed. 188 Notwithstanding the requirement of a "written"
description, it is settled that an inherent description in the specification is an adequate one. 189
Whether a generic description or definition constitutes a
written description of a species or sub-genus included within
the genus is frequently a troublesome problem. It was considered in two cases this past year.190 In In re Edwards,191 the issue was whether the applicant could rely on an earlier
application to provide a "written description" of the presently
claimed invention, where it was necessary to select ingredients
and narrow ranges within the scope of the earlier application in
order to conform with the claims of the present case. Concluding that "each case turns on its own specific facts,"'1 92 the court
found in the earlier application a basis for selecting the restricted ranges and specific ingredients necessary to make out
the later claimed invention. Explaining, the court stated:
The function of the description requirement is to insure that
the inventor had possession as of the filing date of the application
relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him. To
comply with the description requirement, it is not necessary that
the application describe the claimed invention in ipsis verbis; all
that is required is that it reasonably convey to persons skilled in
the art that, as of the filing date thereof, the inventor had possession of the subject matter later claimed by him. In the context of
the present case, this translates into whether the patent application provides adequate direction which reasonably leads persons
skilled in the art to the later claimed compound. By the very93nature of this inquiry, each case turns on its own specific facts.
187. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
188. Evans v. Eaton, Pa., 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822); In re Karnofsky,
390 F.2d 994, 156 U.S.P.Q. 682 (C.C.P.A. 1968); cf. In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376,

178 U.S.P.Q. 279 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (fact that description is narrower than invention does not render the claim invalid); Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Shelby
Poultry Co., 293 F.2d 127, 130 U.S.P.Q. 289 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (does not have to
disclose all the refinements of a production model); Cameron Iron Works v.
Stepall, 242 F.2d 17, 112 U.S.P.Q. 411 (5th Cir. 1957).
189. Chubb & Sons Co. v. Omron Tateisi Elecs. Co., 196 U.S.P.Q. 677
(D.D.C. 1976); Light v. Hauss, 199 U.S.P.Q. 587 (B.P.I. 1978).
190. E.g., In re Schreiber, 587 F.2d 59, 199 U.S.P.Q. 782 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In
re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 196 U.S.P.Q. 465 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see In re
Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312, 197 U.S.P.Q. 5 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
191. 568 F.2d 1349, 196 U.S.P.Q. 465 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
192. Id. at 1354, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 469; see In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 195
U.S.P.Q. 434 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
193. In re Edwards, 568 F.2d at 1351, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 467 (citations omit-
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In re Schreiber194 also involved the question of whether a
generic disclosure supported a specific example embraced
within, but not specifically stated as such in, the earlier application. In contrast to Edwards, the Schreiber court held that one
could not claim a species based on an earlier-filed generic application which did not expressly disclose that species. Unfortunately, the decision in Schreiber is rather brief and does not
explore the breadth of the problem. More case development is
certain to occur.
2.

Enablement

The "enablement" requirement of section 112, sometimes
spoken of as the two requirements of "how to make" and "how
to use," derives from the statutory phrase "the manner and
process of making and using [the invention] in such ... terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use
the same."'195 An applicant is required to provide an "enablement" of the entire scope or breadth of the invention. 196 The
"enablement" requirement, in brief, means that there must be a
reasonable correlation between the scope of disclosure and the
scope of the claims. 197 In other words, people must be able to
198
practice the invention over the entire claimed range.
ted); see In re Blaser, 556 F.2d 534 194 U.S.P.Q. 122 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (insurance of possession); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 169 U.S.P.Q. 795 (C.C.P.A.
1971) (do not have to describe in ipsis verbis). But see In re Edwards, 568

F.2d at 1354, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 470 (Miller, J., dissenting), where the dissent
placed special emphasis on the majority's holding that a range of 1-5 in the
early application supported a specific number, 3, in the application in issue.
See generally G. ROSE, 1978 PATENT LAw HANDBOOK 54-68 (1978), which has
traced the issue of whether the disclosure of a broad range supports a specific point or a narrower range, which has been the subject of extensive and
inconsistent case development.
194. 587 F.2d 59, 199 U.S.P.Q. 782 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
195. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).

196. Cf.Badowski v. United States, 278 F.2d 934, 125 U.S.P.Q. 656 (Ct. Cl.
1960) (invention covered by patent is defined by language of patent claim
and not by specification; specification merely teaches others one or more
ways of practicing the invention).
197. Charvat v. Commissioner of Patents, 503 F.2d 138, 182 U.S.P.Q. 577
(D.C. Cir. 1974), where the court stated:
The final test is whether the appellant's claims are sufficiently definite to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to produce appellant's
wheel without undue experimentation. Since ... appellant has al-

ready received a process patent, that very fact implies that one skilled
in the art could easily and mechanically reproduce the claimed invention.
Id. at 151, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 587; see Standard Oil Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining
Co., 82 F.2d 488, 28 U.S.P.Q. 408 (7th Cir. 1936) (patent must fix the limit of
its protection to a definition that enables those skilled in the art to readily
interpret and practice it).
198. Talouck v. Nubel, 559 F.2d 1183, 194 U.S.P.Q. 521 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
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Failure to comply with the "enablement" requirement is a
ground for invalidating a patent, even in a motion for summary
judgment. 199 In Hanes Corp. v. Millard,20 0 information was de-

liberately left out of the patent. A document admitted that
"[t] he practical and extremely importantpoint of the lengths of
thread in each type of stitch was not explained in the Picard patent because it was wished at the beginning to make the task
more difficult for eventual counterfeiters. '20 1 When a potential
licensee was unable to produce the claimed fabric, invalidity
was established. 20 2 Even though the patent was directed to a
novel fabric, the patentee's argument that the fabric could be
made on other prior art machines not disclosed in the patent
was unavailing.
In the PTO, a patent's teaching as to how to practice the invention over the claimed range must be accepted as true unless
the Office has a reasonable basis for asserting that the specification was incorrect. 20 3 Nor is it a basis for holding that enablement is faulty where the claims may include an inoperative
range or an inoperative number of components. 20 4 Once the Office does, however, establish a reasonable basis for asserting
that the specification is non-enabling over its entire range, "the
burden shifted to appellant to show that one of ordinary skill in
the art could practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation. '20 5 As the court in In re Sichert explained:
In determining what constitutes undue experimentation, many
factors are taken into account, including the guidance provided by
the specification for selecting those embodiments of the invention
which achieved the disclosed utility. Such guidance is essential
where the invention involves an unpredictable art... [t] he scope

(those skilled in the art should not have to perform undue experiments); In
re Bode, 550 F.2d 656, 193 U.S.P.Q. 12 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (persons skilled in the

art to complement that which has been done); cf. In re Stephens, 529 F.2d
1343, 188 U.S.P.Q. 659 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (other considerations are the nature of
the invention, the state of the prior art and the relative skill of those in that
art); In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d 676, 185 U.S.P.Q. 152 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (does
not have to convince those skilled in the art that assertions are correct).
199. Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 428 F. Supp. 306, 196 U.S.P.Q. 158 (D.D.C.
1976).
200. 428 F. Supp. 306, 196 U.S.P.Q. 158 (D.D.C. 1976).

201. Id. at 309, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 160 (emphasis in original).
202. Id.; General Elec. Co. v. Brenner, 407 F.2d 1258, 159 U.S.P.Q. 335
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Metal Film Co. v. Melton Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (patent must describe the operative process).
203. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 34 (1966) (claims are to be read in
light of the specification); Charvat v. Commissioner of Patents, 503 F.2d 138,
182 U.S.P.Q. 577 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (specification is to enable one skilled in the
art to reproduce the invention).
204. In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 196 U.S.P.Q. 209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).

205. Id. at 1161, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 215; see In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 169
U.S.P.Q. 367 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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of enablement varies inversely
with the degree of unpredictability
20 6
of the involved factors.
However, where the characteristics of a material are known,
the material need not be defined with precision in the specification in order to comply with "enablement. ' ' 20 7 In In re Goodwin,20 8 the claims involved carbonmonoflouride; one claim
called it "(CF.).." A section 112 rejection was reversed as the
court held:
Despite the undefined subscripts in the term (CFx) n , when we read
these claims in light of the specification, as we must, we are constrained to accept the appellants' contention that the aforementioned term, as employed in their application, is synonymous with
carbonmonoflouride, which the Board described as "a known material of known properties." Notwithstanding appellants have used
the claim terminology "known as (CF )n " and have nonetheless
utterly failed to provide evidence of the knowledge in the art, we
find enough, though by no means overwhelming, support in the
specification to conclude that one skilled in the art would be 20anprised of a reasonable degree of particularity and distinctness.
3.

Best Mode

The "best mode" requirement of section 112 comes from the
phrase "the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention." 210 The year of the "best mode" was 1977.
This previously undiscovered section of the statute was applied,
either as the sole or as the main basis for invalidity, in four
212
cases. 2 11 It was asserted but not sustained in two cases.
This past year, the defense was alive and well, but not
nearly so successful. 213 In Thyssen Plastic Anger K.G. v. In206. In re Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1162, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 215; see In re Fisher, 427
F.2d 833, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
207. In re Goodwin, 576 F.2d 375, 198 U.S.P.Q. 1 (C.C.P.A. 1978); cf. Edison
Elec. Light Co. v. United States Elec. Light Co., 52 F. 300 (2d Cir. 1892)
(something may be left to the knowledge and skill of the mechanic or manufacturer and yet be definite).
208. 576 F.2d 375, 198 U.S.P.Q. 1 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
209. Id. at 378, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 3.
210. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
211. E.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 550 F.2d 355, 193
U.S.P.Q. 1 (6th Cir. 1977); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Acorn Bldg. Components,
Inc., 548 F.2d 155, 192 U.S.P.Q. 737 (6th Cir. 1977); Trans-World Display v.
Mechronics Corp., 437 F. Supp. 692, 195 U.S.P.Q. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Thyssen Plastik Anger K-G. v. Induplas, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. 534 (D.P.R. 1977),
rev'd, 576 F.2d 400, 200 U.S.P.Q. 199 (1st Cir. 1978).
212. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 537
F.2d 896, 192 U.S.P.Q. 68 (7th Cir. 1976); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v.
Racher Corp., 188 U.S.P.Q. 214 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 453, 191
U.S.P.Q. 1 (1st Cir. 1976); see Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 197 U.S.P.Q. 164 (E.D. Tex. 1977) (one of many successful defenses was that the best mode requirement had not been complied with).
213. See Carlson, Best Mode Disclosure Requirement in Patent Practice,
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duplas, Inc.,214 the patent concerned a method for forming extruder pipes or tubes. This involved a periodic slowing down of
the speed at which the length of the pipe traveled to create a
thickened portion of the pipe. This slowing was accomplished
shown in the patent
by a "second gear" attachment, which was
'2 15
as merely a box marked "conventional.
The First Circuit reversed the lower court's summary rejection of the patent. 2 16 Without commenting on the "contemplated by the inventor" phrase of section 112, it held that there
were factual issues as to whether the "second gear" was in fact
the best mode and whether it was in fact "conventional and
'217
known.
In Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam,
Inc.,218 the patentee intentionally failed to disclose the best
mode of carrying out his invention. The court held that the failure to disclose the need for an impervious carpet seaming tape,
a "necessary element" of the invention, "when it was known to
the inventor at the time he filed [his] application ... was...
fraud of the Patent Office and of the public. '2 19 The invention,
which was accompanied by widespread copying and extensive
licensing, was lost. Further, once the main patent was declared
invalid by reason of "unclean hands," all the other patents in the
package were held unenforceable by failing to disclose the best
mode.
Although the best mode contemplated by the inventor must
be disclosed, this need not take the form of an actual working
22 1
example. 220 And only a single "best mode" need be disclosed.
ENG. L. REV. 246 (1977); Carlson, The Best Mode Disclosure Requirement in PatentPractice, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 171 (1971).
214. 576 F.2d 400, 200 U.S.P.Q. 197 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'g 195 U.S.P.Q. 534
(D.P.R. 1977).
215. Id. at 400, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 198.

13 N.

216. Id.
217. Id. at 402, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 199. The court held, "Summary judgment
is not to be turned into a trial by affidavit ....(I)t is not to be turned into a
trial by affidavit and depositions. The resolution of genuine issues of mate-

rial fact can only be decided after a trial on the merits." See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 197 U.S.P.Q. 164 (E.D. Tex. 1977)

(where one of many successful defenses was that the best mode requirement had not been complied with).
218. 197 U.S.P.Q. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
219. Id. at 247; cf. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69,
193 U.S.P.Q. 449 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (only has to disclose best mode conceived

by him, not all conceivable modes).
220. Ex parte Krenzer, 199 U.S.P.Q. 227 (Bd. App. 1978).
221. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 457 F. Supp. 482, 198
U.S.P.Q. 529 (N.D. Ind. 1978); cf. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States,
553 F.2d 69, 193 U.S.P.Q. 449 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (not all conceivable modes need

to be described).
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The "best mode" is an essential requirement of section 112,
and an applicant must comply with this in order to be entitled to
rely on an earlier-filed application under section 119 or section
120.222 Thus, in an interference, 223 if there is evidence that a
party failed to disclose the best mode, the evidence must be considered. The evidence is ancillary to the priority issue (of the
second application) and if sustained will prevent reliance on an
224
earlier application.
4.

ParticularlyPointing Out and Distinctly Claiming

The requirement that the claims "particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention" appears in the second paragraph of 35
U.S.C. section 112.225 In general, this means that the claims
must have a reasonably definite and determinable meaning so
that persons reading the patent will have a fair idea of the scope
226
of the protection.
In Gould, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 2 2 7 the court was
confronted with different meanings of the word "surface" as applied to the base and to the bumps on an electrostatic printing
paper. Recognizing that there were "some problems of word usage which were not at all felicitously resolved" in the patent,
and that this had caused a "semantic mire," the court nonetheless found that the claims were sufficiently definite for validity
228
and to establish infringement.

The court in Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc. 229 considered particularity and distinctness among the innumerable
grounds for invalidating patents. The court said:
222. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 119-120 (1976). These provisions provide an advan-

tage for applicants within the United States over those applying in foreign
countries.

223. An interference occurs when two applicants fie for a patent on a
claim that is in whole or in part the same invention. North Carolina v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 537 F.2d 67 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).

224. See Weil v. Fritz, 572 F.2d 856, 196 U.S.P.Q. 600 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (the
"best mode" disclosure requirement is ancillary to priority and hence
within the jurisdiction of the Board of Patent Interferences). The court
overruled Thompson v. Durr, 166 F.2d 443, 77 U.S.P.Q. 49 (C.C.P.A. 1948);
Mahan v. Doumani, 333 F.2d 896, 142 U.S.P.Q. 19 (C.C.P.A. 1964).

225. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
226. In re Conley, 490 F.2d 972, 180 U.S.P.Q. 454 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (scope
must be clear to distinctly point out and particularly claim).

227. 196 U.S.P.Q. 13 (N.D. La. 1977).
228. Id. at 17. The court held that there is a heavy burden on those claiming the patent to be invalid); see King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Tastee Freez
Indus., Inc., 357 F.2d 875, 149 U.S.P.Q. 4 (7th Cir. 1966).
229. 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d
979, 201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir. 1978).
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The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the patent law does not
require alleged infringers to play this type of Russian roulette. The
patentee simply failed to inform the public of the limits of his monopoly with the result that those producing the yarns could never
know which process could be safely used without a license and
which could not. The patent is void for indefiniteness under 35
U.S.C. § 112.230
5.

Old Combination

A surprising development this year is the resurgence of the
"old combination" rejection, that is, the ostensible impropriety
of a claim covering the combination of a novel element with old
elements. 23 1 The doctrine dates back to the Supreme Court de232
cision of Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp.
This past year in Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton IndustrialProducts,
Inc.,233 the court explained:
That case [Lincoln] involved a suit for contributory infringement
against a supplier of an old element which was included in the
claim of the alleged combination patent. The patent claimed a combination of a grease gun, hose, coupler and fitting of the type commonly used for packing wheel bearings. All the elements, as well
as their use in combination, were known to the art. The only novelty stemmed from improvement in the "chuck" or coupler that
utilized fluid pressure to "cock" the jaws of the coupler after each
operation. The basic structure of even the "chuck" remains conventional however. The Supreme Court held that the minor improvement in the coupler does not justify a claim embracing the
entire mechanism. "[T]he improvement of any one part of an old
combination gives no right to claim that improvement in combination with other
old parts which perform no new function in the
234
combination."
On the purported authority of Lincoln, at least one lower court
had held invalid claims to a combination of elements where one
of the elements was new, but where the overall combination was
235
old (in a loose sense).
236
The next major development occurred in In re Gustafson.
The case actually involved a rejection on "aggregation" and was

230. Id. at 738, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 419; see United Carbon Co. v. Binney Co.,
317 U.S. 364 (1938).
231. Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filters &Eng'r Co., 406 F.2d 431, 160 U.S.P.Q.
182 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969); cf.Nasco, Inc. v. Vision
Wrap, Inc., 352 F.2d 905, 147 U.S.P.Q. 297 (7th Cir. 1965) (must be considered
as a whole).
232. 303 U.S. 545, 37 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1938).
233. 586 F.2d 917, 199 U.S.P.Q. 641 (2d Cir. 1978).
234. Id. at 921, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 645; accord, Bassick Mfg. Co. v. R.M. Hollingshead Co., 298 U.S. 415, 29 U.S.P.Q. 311 (1936).
235. See, e.g., Holstenson v. V-M Corp., 325 F.2d 109, 139 U.S.P.Q. 401 (6th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 966 (1964).
236. 331 F.2d 905, 141 U.S.P.Q. 585 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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reversed and remanded because the Patent Office had never explicitly said what part of the statute authorized such a rejection.
This was taken by the bar and by the bench as a disavowal of the
"old combination" rejection. 2 37 However, two years later, the
CCPA in In re Bernhart238 found a statutory basis for the "old
combination" rejection. The court held that section 112 author239
ized the rejection.
Illustrating the rebirth of the defense were five recent decisions which concerned the "old combination" rejection. In Pettibone Corp. v. Fargo Machine & Tool Co.,240 the issue was
whether the supplier of an unpatented component of a patented
combination was liable as an infringer if the component was the
novel element in a combination claim. Conversely, was the
claim valid? After reviewing the authorities, the court answered
"yes" to both questions, stating:
Where a combination patent claims one component as its principal
novelty, and that novelty is described in an environment of old elements, a party who supplies a novel element to be used in the environment described in the patent is a contributory infringer. There
would be no contributory infringement if a party supplied one of
the old elements as a replacement part, and no contributory infringement if a party supplies the novel component for a different
purpose. But when a party supplies the novel components for use
in the defined environment,241the patentee has a cause of action for
contributory infringement.
Then, in Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial Products,
Inc.,242 the Connecticut district court declined to follow a prior
Court of Claims adjudication of a patent on an improved seal for
a ball valve, where the claims were to the combined ball, valve,
and improved seal. The "old combination" defense had been
raised but rejected by the Court of Claims in a prior suit, although this was not appreciated by the district court. Applying
Lincoln and its progeny, the district court granted summary
judgment of invalidity on the ground of old combination.
Promptly thereafter, the defendants in the Court of Claims
237. See In re Braithwaite, 379 F.2d 594, 154 U.S.P.Q. 29 (C.C.P.A. 1967)

(Smith, J., concurring) (terming the aggregation rejection "discarded").

238. 417 F.2d 1395, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611 (C.C.P.A. 1969). But see Exparte Barber, 187 U.S.P.Q. 244 (Bd. App. 1974), where the board did not take Bernhart

as a definitive statement of law.
239. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1403, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 618, where the court
stated, "The Patent Office Board of Appeals... in Ex parte Des Granges,
864 O.G. 112, 162 U.S.P.Q. 379 (1968) . . .found that there was a statutory

basis for therejection in that portion of section 112 which requires that the
claims specifically point out and distinctly claim the invention."
240. 447 F. Supp. 1278, 198 U.S.P.Q. 42 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
241. Id. at 1283, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 47.

242. 427 F. Supp. 756, 195 U.S.P.Q. 65 (D. Conn. 1977), rev'd, 586 F.2d 917,
199 U.S.P.Q. 641 (2d Cir. 1978).
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moved for modification in that court based on the Connecticut
decision. 243 This was denied for several reasons, one of which
was that the predicate of the Connecticut decision, namely that
old combination had not been involved in the Court of Claims,
was erroneous.
On appeal from the Connecticut case, the Second Circuit reversed. 2 " After extensively reviewing the authorities, it concluded:
A combination claim containing elements old in the art may be patented, not only when it discloses a "new function" within the meaning of Lincoln Engineering, supra,but also when, by cooperation of
the elements claimed, it discloses a new result that represents a
marked improvement over prior art.
Moreover, we think that the addition of the elements of ball
and valve to the novel sealing ring narrowed rather than broadened
the claims. The aphorism that "in a patent claim, more means less"
is true here. Jamesbury is not attempting to prevent others from
using any ball valve but is attempting to prevent
others from using
24 5
only a ball valve with a sealing ring like this.

Indeed, as a matter of utility, "the novelty lies in the very combination of valve, ball and sealing rings.

24 6

The last case concerning "old combination" was Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.247 The court applied the defense
and, largely on that basis, invalidated one of the patents, stating:
Contrary to defendants' argument, the heater elements on the
"375" patent does not "cooperate" with the other elements within
the meaning of the Lincoln Engineering doctrine, for cooperation
with other elements means something more than the performance
by each element of the same function in the same manner it was
designed to perform. Normally all elements, old or new, must of
necessity "co-act" or the machine will not operate. In order to support a finding of invention, however, it must appear that the co-action of the improved elements with the old element has a
synergistic effect ....
In summary, the "375" patent represents nothing more than the
sixth repatenting by Chavanoz of an old combination with one element, the heater, improved, with the other element performing the
same function in identical fashion in each of the "invention" and
with any results in the operation of the overall apparatus being di243. E.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 756,
195 U.S.P.Q. 65 (Ct. Cl. 1977), rev'd, 586 F.2d 917, 199 U.S.P.Q. 641 (2d Cir.
1978).

244. 586 F.2d 917, 199 U.S.P.Q. 641 (2d Cir. 1978).
245. Id. at 923-24, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 647-48. (emphasis in original).
246. Id. at 921, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 644; cf. Reese v. Elkhart Welding &Boiler
Works, Inc., 447 F.2d 517, 171 U.S.P.Q. 129 (7th Cir. 1971) (combination of
elements to produce a new and useful result).
247. 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d
979, 201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir. 1978).
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rectly attributable to the improvement in the heater element. The
248
patent is condemned under the doctrine of Lincoln Engineering.
6.

Markush Claims

One day someone will build a monument, a large one, to the
attorney in Ex parte Markush.249 Not only did he patent an invention, but he invented a patent. And, further, he made more
work for more lawyers than anyone outside of Congress.
Scarcely a year goes by without there being extensive developments in Markush claim practice. In recent years the controversy has centered around the PTO's procedure of "withdrawing
from consideration" of a Markush claim and refusing to consider
it on the merits because it was directed to "multiple patentably
distinct inventions. ' 250 The 1978 Markush issue was whether 35
U.S.C. section 121251 is a basis for withdrawing, rejecting, objecting to, or otherwise disallowing a Markush claim which em252
braces "patently distinct" species.
In In re Weber, 25 3 the claims were rejected "for misjoinder
under 35 U.S.C. section 121" and "as being improper Markush
claims. ' 254 The latter rejection was treated by the CCPA as being "supportive" of the former. The court first held that it had
jurisdiction over both rejections but then proceeded to contend
that section 121 provides a basis for rejecting Markush claims
which embrace two or more distinct inventions. The court reasoned that this would be improper.
An applicant is given, by the statute, the right to claim his invention with the limitations he regards as necessary to circumscribe that invention, with the proviso that the application comply
with the requirements of § 112. We have decided in the past that
§ 112, second paragraph, which says in part "[tihe specification
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention" allows the inventor to claim the invention
as he contemplates it. In re Wolfrum, 486 F.2d 588, 179 USPQ 620
(CCPA 1973).
As a general proposition, an applicant has a right to have each
248. Id. at 713-18, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 398-402 (you pay your money, you take
your choice).
249. 1925 C.D. 126, 340 O.G. 839 (1925).
250. See In re Haas, 486 F.2d 1053, 179 U.S.P.Q. 623 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re
Wolfrum, 486 F.2d 588, 179 U.S.P.Q. 620 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
251. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1976) provides in relevant part: "... if two or more
independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application the
Commissioner may require the application to be restricted to one of the
inventions."
252. See In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461, 198 U.S.P.Q. 334 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re
Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 198 U.S.P.Q. 328 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
253. 580 F.2d 455, 198 U.S.P.Q. 328 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
254. Id. at 459, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 332.
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claim examined on the merits .... If, however, a single claim is
required to be divided up and presented in several applications,
that claim would never be considered on its merit. The totality of
the resulting fragmentary claims would not necessarily be the
equivalent of the original claim .... 255
Reasoning further, the court recognized that the Office
"must have some means for controlling such administrative
matters as examiner caseloads and the amount of searching
done per filing fee. ' 256 This, however, does not justify transgression of the statute. The court reasoned, "But, in drawing priorities between the Commissioner as administrator and the
applicant as beneficiary of his statutory rights, we conclude that
the statutory rights are paramount. We hold that a rejection
under § 121 violates the basic right of the applicant to claim his
invention as he chooses. ' 257 Accordingly, the rejection was reversed and remanded for consideration of the "improper Markush" rejection.
Judge Rich concurred in Weber.25 8 He argued that section
121 "says nothing whatever about the rejection of claims, a matter entirely separate from restriction." He emphasized:
The practice here challenged is tantamount to a refusal by the
PTO to examine a single Markush claim in a single application because, in its opinion, it is broad enough to 'embrace' or 'cover' a
plurality of inventions which, if presented separately, would 2be
59
separately patentable, assuming any one of them to be prior art.
He then went on to deplore the attempts by the PTO to stave off
appellate review of its Markush claim practices, terming them
"mere semantic gamesmanship. ' 260
The upshot of Weber is that the Office now has to find a new
basis for rejecting Markush claims as being "improper." Merely
because the claims cover several inventions is not, under the
261
statutes, sufficient basis for sustaining a rejection.
255. Id. at 458, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 331.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 458-59, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 332; In re Hass, 580 F.2d 461, 198 U.S.P.Q.
334 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (§ 121 does not provide a basis for rejection of a claim).
258. In re Weber, 580 F.2d at 459, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 333.
259. Id. at 460, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 333 (emphasis in original).
260. Id. at 461, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 334.
261. Accord, In re Lee, 199 U.S.P.Q. 108 (C.P.T. 1978) (restriction based
on requirement that different claims must be "patentable over each other"
was improper); see Ex parte Lewis, 197 U.S.P.Q. 543 (Bd. App. 1977) (as to
what constitutes a "proper" as opposed to an "improper" claim: the Examiners are admonished to view the claimed compounds as a whole, not as to
whether the particular functional groups on a chicken wire formula are
chemically related or unrelated).
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35 U.S.C. Section 135(b)-Copying Claims

Section 135(b) of the Patent Act provides that:
A claim which is the same as, or for the same or substantially
the same subject matter as, a claim of an issued patent may not be
to one
made in any application unless such a claim is madeprior
262
year from the date on which the patent was granted.
In Corbett v. Chisholm,263 the court considered two aspects of
section 135(b): can one rely on claims previously cancelled from
the pending application, and can one "combine" several claims
to meet the "substantially the same subject matter" requirement? In Chisholm, the specifications of both parties were directed to a method of blow-forming plastics in forming sheets.
Corbett provoked an interference by copying claims from
Chisholm's patent some 26 months after the patent was issued,
and he sought to meet the exception to the one-year cutoff of
section 135(b) by asserting that he had been claiming "the same
or substantially the same subject matter" earlier.
First the court traced the history of section 135(b), both in
the courts and legislature. 264 This statute was essentially a statute of limitation intended to secure a patentee's right, after his
patent had been issued for a period of time, unless there was an
exceptional situation.265 Such a situation would be provided by
another person claiming "the same or substantially the same
266
subject matter" when or shortly after the patent had issued.
The court held that it must consider claims pending in the application prior to the issuance of the opponent's patent, even
267
though the claims had been cancelled prior to the issuance.
Secondly, the court held that the doctrine of inherent disclosure was applicable. However, the inherency required a "necessity" that a limitation of the issued patent be produced when
268
the application claims are followed.
Thirdly and most importantly, the court discussed whether
262. 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (1976).
263. 568 F.2d 759, 196 U.S.P.Q. 337 (C.C.P.A. 1977); see Squire v. Corbett,
560 F.2d 424, 194 U.S.P.Q. 513 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Chisholm was the sequel to
Squire).
264. Corbett v. Chisholm, 568 F.2d at 763, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 362; see Chap-

man v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126 (1920) (the early principles proscribing
delayed copying were akin to laches doctrine); Cryns v. Musher, 161 F.2d
217, 73 U.S.P.Q. 290 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (1939 amendment did not bar reliance on

cancelled claims).
265.

See In re Sity, 331 F.2d 617, 141 U.S.P.Q. 505 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (rejected

because filed more than one year after issuance date).
266. Brailsford v. Lavet, 318 F.2d 942, 138 U.S.P.Q. 28 (C.C.P.A. 1963);
Philco Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 276 F. Supp. 24, 155 U.S.P.Q. 372 (D. Del.
1967).

267. Corbett v. Chisholm, 568 F.2d at 765, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 344.
268. Id. at 766, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 345.
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it could consider several of the application claims together as
evidencing a claim for "the same or substantially the same subject matter" as the patent claimed. 269 Unfortunately, in the present case there were two species involved, and the prior claims
were directed to one of the species while the patent claims primarily concerned the other. The court held, as it rejected the
claims:
We believe, however, that there is a substantial difference between that which is to be gathered from the perusal of a group of
related claims to the same invention and that which is to be gathered from the perusal of a group of claims to related inventions.
The more divergent the subject matter of the individual claims, the
less likely it is that coverage of the interstices there between is realized .... In our opinion, a reading of all four groups of claims,
together, does not manifest a unitary scheme or attempt to secure a
property right on the subject matter defined by [the patent] .270
G.

35 U.S.C. Section 141-Decisions

Reference was made earlier to cases on Markush claim
practice, many of which indirectly concerned 35 U.S.C. section
141, which defines the jurisdiction of the CCPA in terms of what
is a "decision of the Board of Appeals. '27 1 Here the courts con'2 72
sider the statutory phrase "an applicant dissatisfied.
The interesting case of 1978 on what is an "applicant dissatisfied with a decision of the Board of Appeals" was In re
Priest.273 The appellant had won before the board. The board's
decision, however, in reversing the rejection of composition
claims, said that these claims contained a "necessarily inferential" limitation to "particular reaction conditions" of the process
claims. 274 The successful appellant took the case to the CCPA
"because he regarded his claimed compositions as patentable
under the statute without the [process] limitation. '275 In other
words, he was "[a In applicant dissatisfied with the decision of
the Board of Appeals" according to section 141.
The CCPA held that it had jurisdiction under section 141 inasmuch as the board's captioned "Opinion and Decision" expressly found process limitations to be inherently present in the
269. Id.
270. Id.; cf. Engineering Dev. Lab. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 153 F.2d 523, 68
U.S.P.Q. 238 (2d Cir. 1946) (not a different invention if it does not go further
than a previous invention).
271. See notes 209-11 and accompanying text supra.

272. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
273. 582 F.2d 33, 199 U.S.P.Q. 11 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
274. Id. at 35, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 13.
275. Id. at 36, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 13.
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appealed composition claims. 276 On the merits, the board had
erred by importing an "inferential limitation" into claims that
did not recite such limitation. The court found that the claims,
even absent the "inferential limitation," comported with section
112.
H.

35 U.S.C. Sections 116 & 256-Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of
Inventors

Sections 116277 and 256278 of the Patent Act allow either the
Commissioner or a court (after notice and hearing) to correct
inventorship by either adding an erroneously omitted co-inventor or by deleting an erroneously added one. A condition of either change is that there had been "error ... without deceptive
intention." But if there is either nonjoinder or misjoinder of inmay be held
ventors, and this cannot be corrected, the patent
279
invalid under a number of sections of the Act.
Two cases this past year dealt with inventorship problems
and their correction. First, in Weil v. Fritz,280 the court formally
authorized the common practice of changing inventorship by
the method of filing a continuation-in-part application and using
the oath or declaration as the medium for correcting misjoinder
or nonjoinder. 28 1 The words "the same inventor" in 35 U.S.C.
section 120 are "broadly interpreted to embrace the possibility"
of an amended inventorship. The procedure for filing a continu276. In re Priest, 582 F.2d at 36, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 14. The board had made its
statement in the opinion an integral part of that decision. Contrary cases in
which the CCPA "refused to accept jurisdiction to review statements made
by the board in its opinion extraneous to the decision rendered but dis-

pleasing to appellants" were not "factually comparable." See, e.g., In re Willis, 455 F.2d 1060, 172 U.S.P.Q. 667 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Reese, 359 F.2d 462,

149 U.S.P.Q. 362 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Klemperer v. Price, 271 F.2d 743, 123
U.S.P.Q. 539 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
277. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1976) provides: "An invention must be patented by
the joint inventors unless one or more refuse to join or can not be found."
278. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1976) provides: "If one of the joint applicants was

not a joint inventor, upon notice and hearing, the Commissioner may issue
a certificate deleting the name."
279. The patents may be held invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(f) (he did
not invent the subject matter himself); 111 (requiring specification, drawing, and oath); 115 (oath that he is 1st inventor). See also Meikeljon, Misjoinder, Non-joinder, and Whatever-Stoddard v. Dann, 60 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 505 (1978), which discusses A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556,
195 U.S.P.Q. 97 (D.C. Cir. 1977), where the court had filled in the "intersti-

ces" of the Patent Act and permitted a complete change of inventorship;
that is, changing a sole application from one inventor to another without
retaining any inventor in common.
280. 572 F.2d 856, 196 U.S.P.Q. 600 (C.C.P.A. 1978). For a discussion of
§ 120, see note 281 infra.
281. See 35 U.S.C..§ 120 (1976). The continuation in part is still entitled to

the benefit of the filing date of the earlier application.
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ation-in-part to correct inventorship is "legally equivalent" to a
282
section 116 inventorship amendment.
The court further held that the continuation-in-part oath or
declaration:
Is not material to the question ... of entitlement under § 120 to the
benefit of [the earlier application]. The applicant's oath is not a
requirement of § 112, first paragraph, but of 35 U.S.C. § 115; therefore the sufficiency of [the continuation-in-part] oath is not material under § 120,28which
incorporates only the requirements of § 112,
3
first paragraph.

I. 35 U.S.C. Section 251-Reissues
In keeping with the current trend, now formalized in what
has come to be called the "Dann Amendments," 28 4 concerning
reissuing a patent either in contemplation of litigation or in the
course of it, there is an ever increasing number of cases concern285
ing reissues.
In Fisher Controls Co., Inc. v. Control Components, Inc.,286
the court considered whether it should stay the court proceedings until the outcome of the PTO reissue proceedings. According to the court, the consideration must be "whether a stay of
proceedings [in court] pending the outcome of the reissue application, will be of significant benefit to the litigation to justify a
further delay in an already lengthy case.

' 28 7

Holding that here a stay should be granted, the court explained:
The rules governing reissue of patents were amended with the
stated purpose of establishing greater reliability of issued patents,
strengthening the examining procedures, and providing incentive
282. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1976) (joint inventors) with § 120 (application subsequent to previous filing by same inventor accorded earlier filing
date).
283. Weil v. Fritz, 572 F.2d at 863, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 608 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The
second case involving inventorship and its correction is Matter v. Tiegel, 196
U.S.P.Q. 395 (B.P.I. 1976), which held that conversion from joint to sole inventorship is permitted where the conversion is made with reasonable diligence.
284. See 955 O.G. 1054 (February 22, 1977).
285. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1976), which provides in relevant part:
Whenever a patent is, through error without any deceptive intention,
deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective
specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or
less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Commissioner shall,
on the surrender of such patent ... reissue the patent for the invention
disclosed in the original patent ....
286. 443 F. Supp. 581, 196 U.S.P.Q. 817 (S.D. Iowa 1977); see In re Farrow,

554 F.2d 468, 193 U.S.P.Q. 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Salem, 553 F.2d 676, 193
U.S.P.Q. 513 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Orita, 550 F.2d 1277, 193 U.S.P.Q. 145
(C.C.P.A. 1977);. Ex parte Lafferty, 190 U.S.P.Q. 202 (Bd. App. 1975).
287. 443 F. Supp. at 583, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 819.
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to investment in research and development. As amended, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.175, "permits a patent owner to have new prior art considered by
the Office by way of reissue application without making any
changes in the claims or specifications." The procedure may be
used at any time during the period of the patent, and it is suggested
that the federal courts may stay proceedings to allow the process of
a reissue application, permitting new art to be considered by the
PTO.
Although not equal to the litigation opportunities of discovery
and confrontation, the new rules do allow for protest. Under 37
C.F.R. § 1.291, members of the public are afforded a means to both
protest the reissue and to cite prior art to the PTO.
The examination procedure, as amended, offers some assurance that reissue applications will be handled promptly. While requiring a two month delay to assure notice to all interested parties,
the rules give priority to reissue applications over all other applications.
The benefits of the new rules must, of necessity, be found in
informed prediction .... However, several distinct advantages
can be observed in allowing examination of a reissue application
before continuing with patent litigation.
1. All prior art presented to the court will have been first considered by the PTO, with its particular expertise.
2. Many discovery problems relating to prior art can be alleviated by the PTO examination.
3. In those cases resulting in effective invalidity of the patent,
the suit will likely be dismissed.
4. The outcome of the reexamination may encourage a settlement without the further use of the Court.
5. The record of reexamination would likely be entered at
trial, thereby reducing the complexity and length of the litigation.
6. Issues, defenses, and evidence will be more easily limited
in pre-trial conferences after a reexamination.
7. The
cost will likely be reduced both for the parties and for
28 8
the court.
One of the reasons for reissue under 35 U.S.C. section 251 is
to allow corrections if the patent, through error, is deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid "by reason of the patentee
claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent."289 Sometimes, although incorrectly, this has been termed
an inquiry of what the patentee originally "intended to claim."
In In re Mead,290 the difference between the statutory test of
"had a right to claim" and the concept of "intent to claim" was
clarified. The appellant in Mead sought a reissue for the purpose of broadening its broadest claims and then inserting new
288. Id. But see General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watson-Boumal Assoc.,
Inc., 193 U.S.P.Q. 497 (D. Del. 1977) (the court granted the motion to stay).
289. In re Handel, 312 F.2d 943, 136 U.S.P.Q. 460 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
290. 581 F.2d 251, 198 U.S.P.Q. 412 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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claims to subject matter originally disclosed as preferred (the
orientation of bristles) but not originally claimed in the patent.
What apparently happened in Mead was that the patentee
intended to claim the preferred embodiment in a new application filed within a year after the basic patent issued. Later it
was discovered this was impossible by reason of an intervening
interference. Thus, it was imperative, in order to obtain protection on the preferred embodiment, to insert specific claims to
that embodiment in a reissue of the main case.
The court first reviewed the cases concerning the concept of
whether a reissue could only be for subject matter which the
patentee had originally "intended to claim."'291 The court explained, "Thus, 'intent to claim' arose from the requirement that
the reissue be for the 'same invention' as the original, i.e., that it
cover what was 'intended to have been covered' by the origi2 92
nal."
As Mead explained, there is no requirement of the reissue
statute that the reissue could only be for what the patentee had
"an intent to claim"; rather, the inquiry is whether there was a
description of the invention which is the subject of the reissue.
Explaining this, the court stated:
Thus, in Rowand and similar cases, "intends to claim" has little to
do with "intent" per se, but rather is analogous to the requirement
of § 112 first paragraph that the specification contains "a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using
it." It is, as appellant urges, synonymous with "right
293
to claim."
Objectively, the record showed that "the subject matter of the
appealed claims was never intended to be claimed in the original application, and therefore there was no error within the
meaning of section 251."1294
291. Id. at 255, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 416. For the genesis of intent to claim, see

Parker & Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U.S. 87 (1887), where the Court
authorized reissues only "for the same invention" as originally claimed. See
also United States Indus. Chem., Inc. v. Carbide Carbon Chems. Corp., 315
U.S. 668, 53 U.S.P.Q. 6 (1942) (endorsing Parker& Whipple); In re Rowand,
526 F.2d 558, 187 U.S.P.Q. 487 (C.C.P.A. 1975).

292. In re Mead, 581 F.2d at 256, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 417. In Rowand, the court
had required "an essentially factual inquiry confined to the objective intent
manifested by the original patent." In re Rowand, 526 F.2d at 560, 187
U.S.P.Q. at 489.
293. In re Mead, 581 F.2d at 256, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 417.
294. Id. at 256, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 418. The court focused on the "error" requirement of § 251 rather than the "claiming more or less than he had a
right to claim" requirement. See Ex parte Brodbeck, 199 U.S.P.Q. 230 (Bd.
App. 1977), where the court authorized a reissue to correct an ambiguity.
The original disclosure and claims referred to percentage "of the catalyst
pores" having certain sizes; reissue was sought to change this to the same
percentage "of the catalyst pore volume." It was demonstrated that persons
skilled in the art "would appreciate not only the existence of the error of the
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295

Interference Estoppel

The doctrine of interference estoppel is a peculiarity of PTO
practice. What it means is that the loser of an interference
ordinarily cannot obtain claims which (1) read on the lost
claims or (2) cover "clearly common subject matter" in the interfering applications (or application and patent). He can obtain claims which differ only in "obvious" ways from those lost
in the interference, unless his opponent's work or application is
29 6
otherwise statutory prior art.
This past year in Chemetron Corp. v. Airco, Inc.,297 the trial
court was confronted with inconsistent decisions by the Board
of Patent Interferences. Solomonically, it rejected both the inconsistent decisions and the doctrine of interference estoppel,
stating.
In the first place, we have doubts about the applicability of the
doctrine of interference estoppel in the Seventh Circuit and in this
specification but what the error is." Id. at 231; cf. Wayne-Gossard Corp. v.

Moretz Hosiery Mills, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 12, 199 U.S.P.Q. 87 (W.D.N.C. 1977)
(discussed intervening rights as applied to narrowed reissues and the effect
of such intervening rights in patent accounting actions); SAB Indus. AB v.
Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 95 (E.D. Va. 1978). In Bendix Corp., the reissue
application "was not made through inadvertence, accident or mistake, by
reason of which the specification as originally drawn is defective or insufficient" but was "made to enlarge the claims in order to embrace the noninfringing defendant's device which had or was about to come into legitimate use"; the reissue was invalid).
295. A number of survey articles appeared which reviewed recent
developments in the PTO. Parker, Current Developments at the Patent and
Trademark Office, 60 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'Y 57 (1978). See the following articles
printed in COPLEIN & HIRSCH, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAw 1978
(P.L.I. 1978). E.g., Call, Living with Microprocessors 341; Chaskin, Patent
Cooperation Treaty, European and Community Convention 113; Coplein,
Some Non-Judicial Aspects of Foreign Trade for Intellectual Property
Attorneys 384; Dunner, Practice and Trends in United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals 83; Fanwick, Business Aspects of Licensing
191; Greenfield, Antitrust Implications of Patent Practice 251; Heller,
Discovery Practice and Procedure 267; Kinney, Discovery Nitty Gritty 293;
Kurtz, Survey of the Law on Software as Applied to Patents 323; Meller, A
Patentfor Europe 41; Moore, How and When to Terminate a Patent Based
on the Progeny of-Lear v. Adkins 147; Roberts, The New Reissue and
Opposition Proceedingswithin the Patent Office 9; Rose, Antitrust Aspects
ofLicensing 223; Skillman, 1977 Rules on Duty of Disclosure24; Steffey, New
Rules on Duty of Disclosure 71; Taphorn, Software Protection Other Than
Patents 357; Wyatt, JurisdictionOver Offshore Competitors and Out of State
Corporations377.
296. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(e) & (g) (1976); see Meitzner v. Mindick, 549
F.2d 775, 193 U.S.P.Q. 17 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854, 195 U.S.P.Q.
465 (1977); In re Wilding, 535 F.2d 631, 190 U.S.P.Q. 59 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re

McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 188 U.S.P.Q. 428 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Ogiue, 517
F.2d 1382, 186 U.S.P.Q. 227 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
297. 198 U.S.P.Q. 119 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
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court. Research discloses that in recent years, only the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals has followed this doctrine.
Second, the doctrine of interference estoppel has been narrowly applied even by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Even if the doctrine of interference estoppel is applicable in
this court, and even if the facts of this case fit within its contours
the. . . patent should not be invalidated as a result. The reason is
that each time the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held a
patentee estopped, there was a clear and uncontradicted finding of
priority by the Board of Patent Interferences. Here, we simply cannot rely on the finding in
298favor of [one party] in view of the finding
in favor of [the other].
B. Interference Practice
Several important decisions came down this past year on
various aspects of interference practice. While none made new
299
law, a few were out of the ordinary.
1. Derivation
A few cases treated derivation as the principal issue in an
interference. Stated otherwise, the priority question was not
who was the first inventor, but who was the inventor.
In Mead v. McKirnan,300 McKirnan was able to prove that
Mead had derived the invention from him. Derivation requires
proof both of a complete conception and of communication to
the opponent. 30 1 Having found that McKirnan was the originator of the independent count of interference, the court, without
explanation, stated that dependent counts "are obvious variations of the invention of count 1 and therefore rightly belong to
298. Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
299. An especially useful article is Stiefel, Winning an Interferencefor a
ForeignInventor, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 558 (1978), which speaks of 35 U.S.C.
§ 104 (1976), which states in part:
In proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office and in the courts, an
applicant for a patent or a patentee, may not establish a date of invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with
respect thereto in a foreign country, except as provided in 119 of this
title ....

The article gives a number of instances where a foreign inventor either can
obtain the benefit of foreign activities, or deny a United States inventor the
benefit of domestic ones.
300. 585 F.2d 504, 199 U.S.P.Q. 513 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
301. Id. at 506, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 515. The court said:
Where, as here, a question of derivation is raised, the party charging derivation has the burden of showing prior complete conception of
the claimed subject matter and sufficient communication of the subject
matter of the party charged to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to
construct and successfully operate the invention.
See Hedgewick v. Ackers, 498 F.2d 1383, 182 U.S.P.Q. 169 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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McKirnan.
Further elaboration of the burden of proving derivation was
provided in Kilbey v. Thiele.30 3 The board explained:
The issue of derivation is one of fact and the party asserting
derivation has the burden of proof. Derivation is shown by a prior,
complete conception of the claimed subject matter and a communication of the complete conception to the party charged with derivation. The communication must have taken place prior to any date
poson which it can be shown that the one
30 4 charged with derivation
sessed knowledge of the invention.
Later, the board elaborated on the "communication" aspect, explaining that "proof of motive and opportunity alone is insufficient" to establish communication.
2.

Conception

How complete must a party's conception be? In Gunter v.
Stream,30 5 one of the parties read a magazine article on heat
pipes and concluded that they would be a good substitute for
cooling fans in a certain application. Apparently he did not have
a detailed concept of every feature of the device, but he did conceive of "all the essential elements of the counts." Holding that
this was sufficient, the court stated:
The conception of the invention consists in the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act. All that remains to be
accomplished in order to perfect the act or instrument, belongs to
the department of construction, not invention. It is therefore the
formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is thereafter to
conception,
be applied in practice, that constitutes
30 6 an available
within the meaning of the patent law.
However, Gunter does not excuse an inventor who has an
7
imperfect understanding of the invention. 30 Apparently, the inof a
ventor must at least have an appreciation for the30 importance
8
certain feature ultimately recited in the count.
302. 585 F.2d at 507, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 516.
303. 199 U.S.P.Q. 290 (B.P.I. 1978).
304. Id. at 294; accord, Ostrowski v. Koral, 197 U.S.P.Q. 53 (B.P.I. 1976)
(where derivation was likewise not proven).
305. 573 F.2d 77, 197 U.S.P.Q. 482 (C.C.P.A. 1978); cf. Knowles v. Tibetts,
347 F.2d 591, 146 U.S.P.Q. 59 (C.C.P.A. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 927 (1966)
(conception in inventor's mind of the complete operative invention).
306. Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d at 79, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 484, quoting, Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 1897 C.D. 724 (D.C. Cir. 1897).
307. Anderson v. Anderson, 403 F. Supp. 834, 188 U.S.P.Q. 194 (D.D.C.),
a.f'd, 543 F.2d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (disclosure must be in such clear terms
so as to enable person skilled in the art to carry it out).
308. Cf. Michelette v. Tapia v. Wignall, 196 U.S.P.Q. 858 (B.P.I. 1976)
(agent had imperfect understanding of the invention; nor did he appreciate
the importance of a certain feature in the court).
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Diligence

The CCPA, in Naber v. Cricchi,30 9 reversed a priority award
and found that a party was not diligent when he could have reduced the invention to practice earlier using existing technology, but spent considerable time developing an improved
310
The invention
method of making one feature of the invention.
was an improved "drain-source-protected" metal-nitride-oxidesemiconductor device which could be used as a memory element in an integrated circuit. During a critical 12-month period,
Cricchi devoted considerable time to developing a new layer
deposition technique. He admitted that a simple state-of-the-art
transistor could have been built at any earlier time and used for
testing the invention. This was fatal. The time was not spent in
reducing the invention to practice, but in working out commercial technology. Explaining, the court stated:
The record shows that the work done. . . to improve ... layer
deposition techniques was generally applicable to all [semi-conductor] devices, not merely the "drain-source-protected" device
Cricchi's conception of the invention. It is well settled that to satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement of 35 U.S.C. 102(g), the
work relied on must ordinarily be directly related to reduction to
practice of the invention of the counts in issue. However, work in
preparation for fiing related patent applications may suffice, as
may work required to develop a first invention in order to develop
or reduce to practice a second invention.
There is no evidence that Cricchi's layered deposition techniques work was in preparation for filing related patent applications or was required to develop a first invention needed to proceed
with the invention of the counts ... Cricchi ... admitted that a
simple transistor embodying the structure embraced by the counts
could have been built and tested for its memory characteristics.
Cricchi chose not to proceed to a reduction to practice with a simple transistor, but to wait until work on layer deposition techniques
progressed. Since he admittedly "possessed the capability of conducting such a test," it was his burden to reconcile the waiting period with the "reasonable diligence" requirement.
The board found . . . that the work on layer deposition techniques was required to produce a "useful device," rather than a
"mere laboratory device." However, there need not be commercial
3 11
utility to have a reduction to practice.
309. 567 F.2d 382, 196 U.S.P.Q. 294 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
826, 200 U.S.P.Q. 64 (1978).
310. See In re Tansel, 253 F.2d 241, 117 U.S.P.Q. 188 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (must
work to reduce invention to practice); cf. D'Amico v. Koike, 347 F.2d 867, 146
U.S.P.Q. 132 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (rule of reason and liberality should be applied).
311. Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d at 385, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 296 (citations omitted); cf. Rines v. Morgan, 250 F.2d 365, 116 U.S.P.Q. 145 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (does
not have to drop all his work).
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Reduction to Practice

An interesting quirk of interference law arose in Elders v.
Hardy.312 If a party has not moved to dissolve the interference
on the basis that his opponent's application does not support the
count, he cannot later argue that an actual reduction to practice
of the identical device of the application is not within the count
of interference.
A relaxed standard of corroborating a reduction to practice
was applied in Viventi v. Pines.31 3 The count was to a sulfurcontaining compound for protecting metals from corrosion, and
it appeared that no person had directly witnessed the reduction
to practice. There were, however, "admittedly genuine and witnessed notebook pages [which] provide the details of the operation." A witness, who testified that he worked nearby, had a
general knowledge of the inventor's work and was aware that
the inventor was working on sulfur compounds as "this was
quite evident owing to the odors that emanated from his laboratory. '3 14 On the basis of unchallenged notebooks of the inventor, a corroborated reduction to practice was found. A "rule of
reason" was applied.
C. Interference Civil Actions
Interference decisions by the Board of Patent Interferences
may be appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
under 35 U.S.C. sections 141-144, or a civil action may be brought
in a district court under section 146.315 The principal difference
is that an appeal to the CCPA calls for a determination "on the
evidence produced before the Patent and Trademark Office
[Board of Patent Interferences]," while a civil action includes
the PTO record but is "without prejudice to the right of the par312. 198 U.S.P.Q. 374 (B.P.I. 1977). Ordinarily, there must be corroborating reduction to practice. See Cislak v. Wagner, 215 F.2d 275, 103 U.S.P.Q. 39

(C.C.P.A. 1954).
313. 199 U.S.P.Q. 235 (B.P.I. 1976).
314. Id. at 237; cf. Patterson v. Hauck, 341 F.2d 131, 144 U.S.P.Q. 481

(C.C.P.A. 1965) (all the evidence should be reviewed).
315. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1976), which provides in relevant part:
A party to an interference dissatisfied with the decision of the board of
patent interferences on the question of priority may appeal to the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, but such appeal

shall be dismissed if any adverse party to such interference, within
twenty days after the appellant has filed notice of appeal according to
section 142 of this title, files notice with the Commissioner that he
elects to have all further proceedings conducted as provided in section

146 of this title. Thereupon the appellant shall have thirty days thereafter within which to file a civil action under section 146, in default of
which the decision appealed from shall govern the further proceedings

in the case.
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ties to take further testimony. '316 In other words, it is a trial de
novo. But how much can be "novo"?
Over the years, an extended body of law has developed on
when a party is not permitted to take such "further testimony"
by reason of his not having presented the testimony earlier to
the board. Although the rule is differently stated by the various
courts, in general, a party will not be allowed to offer testimony
if he intentionally, or with gross negligence, did not present it to
the board.
In Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co.,317 Velsicol had
lost an interference and then took the case to the district court.
Its loss in the PTO was in large part due to the intentional failure to take testimony of two witnesses who, it was later asserted, could have corroborated the reduction to practice. One
of them had witnessed the laboratory notebooks. The court held
that the deliberate failure to call those witnesses was either intentional or virtually gross negligence. Otherwise stated, the notion that section 146 civil actions are "de novo" must be qualified
to recognize that the deference which a court must pay to a PTO
holding of priority requires that the best evidence be submitted
3 18
to the PTO in the first instance.
D. InternationalPatents
On June 1, 1978, both the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the
3 19
European Patent Convention went into effect.
E. CCPA Confidentiality
The CCPA's rule 5.13(g) provides that, on motion, records of
a pending appeal will be maintained in confidence and the court
will sit in camera.320 In the absence of a motion made and
316. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1976) with § 146. In other words, a trial de

novo. But how much can be novo?
317. 579 F.2d 1038, 198 U.S.P.Q. 584 (7th Cir. 1978).

318. Id.; see 579 F.2d at 1051, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 596 (Pell, J., dissenting). The
dissent felt the language of § 146, "without prejudice to the rights of the par-

ties to take further testimony," had been applied incorrectly. Instead, the
majority "has created a new and stultifying standard for the litigant who
desires to appeal a decision of the Board of Patent Interferences."
319. See Meller, A Patentfor Europe, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 1978 91 (B.P.I. 1978), which discusses the provisions of both. See
also Benson, The Impact of the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Convention on U.S. Practitioners,60 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 118 (1978).
320. See C.C.P.A. Rules, Rule 5.13(g) (In camera proceedings), which
provides: "In a proper case where the interests of justice require, and on a
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granted, the records of the CCPA are open to the public.

In a case of first impression, In re Sarkar,322 the appellant in
an application involving a computer program filed a motion
under the Rule concurrent with his filing of the transcript. The
clerk sealed the transcript and submitted the motion to the
court for consideration.
The court sustained its own rule, holding:
Any federal court has the inherent authority to seal its record
when, in the exercise of sound discretion, such action is deemed
appropriate. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 46
U.S.L.W. 4320 (1978). Our Rule 5.13(g) is merely declaratory of this
inherent authority never before exercised by this court to protect a
trade secret in an ex parte patent appeal.
We are guided in our determination by the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 181
U.S.P.Q. 673 (1974), from which we glean the sentiment that, whenever possible, trade secret law and patent law should be administered in such a manner that the former will not deter an inventor
from seeking the benefit of the latter ....323
Thereafter, in In re Mosher,324 the attorney challenged an
order sealing the record. Again Rule 5.13(g) was sustained, as
the court stated:
An absence of Rule 5.13(g) would encourage if not require, those
who have disclosed trade secrets in a proferred exchange for the
limited-term patent right to exclude others, to forego appeal and
fall back upon the unlimited-term protection of trade secret laws,
thereby denying the public early (or any) disclosure, and defeating
the very purpose of the patent system.
Petitioner's solicitation and concern for the burdens upon this
court, though laudable, are unfounded ....
We do not share the view that Rule 5.13(g) opens a pandora's
box ....325
V.

LITIGATION PROCEDURE

A.

Attorneys

Be kind to your friendly neighborhood patent attorney.
He's had a rough year. In opinions during the past twelve
months, the courts have borne down on patent attorneys with
convincing showing thereof by motion properly made, the court will sit in
camera, or seal its record, or both." In re Sarker, 575 F.2d 870, 872, 197
U.S.P.Q. 788, 790 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
321. In re Mosher, 248 F.2d 956, 115 U.S.P.Q. 140 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
322. 575 F.2d 870, 197 U.S.P.Q. 788 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
323. Id. at 872, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 790-91.
324. 199 U.S.P.Q. 82 (C.C.P.A. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910, 201 U.S.P.Q.
256 (1979).
325. Id. at 84.
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unprecedented ferocity. The decisions make for colorful reading, but for uncomfortable seating.
Little sympathy need be wasted for appellant's counsel, in
Scully Signal Co. v. Electronics Corp.,326 whose valor was the
better part of his discretion. Telling the Court of Appeals that in
"thirty years of practice ... [he] has never seen such a travesty
of technology, let alone justice," in an appeal from the decision
of a trial judge who had "never in his life upheld a patent,"
brought on a sharp rebuke and a short affirmance.
The attorney in In re Milmore327 was suspended from practice before the PTO for one year by reason of his having withheld a "pertinent reference which should have been called to the
attention of the Examiner during prosecution." Evidence of improper intent was found in a letter from the attorney which
stated that the reference would make the claims "invalid even if
I succeeded in getting the Examiner to allow them."
Similarly, a reissue application, in In re Stockebrand,328 was
stricken on the ground that "fraud" within the meaning of Rule
56 had been perpetrated in the original application by not disclosing "prior public use or on sale" events. A letter from the
attorney advised the inventor that "you're late."
In General Electric Co. v. Valeron Corp.,329 the defendant's
attorney was removed from the case by reason of his having prepared and prosecuted patent applications for the plaintiff which
had given him access to "substantially related" inventions. He
had an "opportunity" to learn the applicant's assignee's confidences to such an extent that his continuing to represent the
defendant would lend an "appearance of impropriety" to the
representation. The court synthesized the following principles:
1. If there is a substantialrelationship or a sufficiently close relationship between the matters on which the attorney worked in
his prior retainer and the matters in which he has worked on
his subsequent retainer, this is all that the former client need
show.
2. This substantial relationship or sufficiently close relationship
test is compelled by the nature of the relationship of attorney
and client.
3. All confidences and information of the client are to be protected.
4. The ethical considerations which support this concept require
that a lawyer should reserve the confidences and secrets of his
326. 570 F.2d 355, 196 U.S.P.Q. 657 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945,
198 U.S.P.Q. 384 (1978).
327. 196 U.S.P.Q. 628 (C.P.T. 1977).
328. 197 U.S.P.Q. 857 (C.P.T. 1978). See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).

329. 428 F. Supp. 68, 196 U.S.P.Q. 298 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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5.

client and that a lawyer should always avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety in so doing.
Because of these considerations, a lawyer should be disqualified in a representation in which he may have had access or opclient need
portunity to obtain confidential material and the
330
show no more than this in order to be protected.

3 31
dealt with a freThe court in Connell v. Clairol, Inc.,
quently arising issue: under what circumstances is the firm that
prepared and prosecuted a patent application precluded from
representing the patentee in litigation if it appears that one of
the defenses will be fraud on the Patent Office? Relying on the
Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility of
the American Bar Association, the court adopted two tests:

Specifically, Disciplinary Rules 5-102(a) and (b) require that an attorney and his law firm withdraw from the conduct of the trial if an
attorney learns that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as
a witness on behalf of this client; and if he or a lawyer in his form
it is
may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, if332
apparent that such testimony may be prejudicial to his client.
Although the court refused to apply an exception where this
would create a "hardship" on the client, it did qualify the holdings, stating:
If by merely announcing his intention to call opposing counsel
as a witness, an adversary could thereby orchestrate that counsel's
disqualification under the Disciplinary Rules, such "a device"
might often be employed as a purely tactical maneuver ... therefore ... the court should determine whether counsel's testimony
is, in fact, genuinely needed. In the case sub judice, defendant as
movant for disqualification of plaintiffs counsel, has declared its intent to call [plaintiffs' attorney] as a witness to show alleged "inequitable conduct" by the plaintiffs at the time their patent
application3 was filed in that there was a failure to disclose relevant
prior art.

33

Among other problems, patent attorneys seem to have con334
While plaintiffs' counsel
siderable trouble in writing clearly.
in Bendix Corp. v.
opprobrium,
of
share
their
in
for
come
have
335
which characlogomachy
"the
noted
court
the
United States,
has unduly
[which]
dialectic
regressive
terizes defendant's
and vascope
of
issue
complicated the otherwise conventional
330. Id. at 71, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 302.
331. 440 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. La. 1977).
332. Id. at 18-19.
333. Id.; see United States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
334. See, e.g., Janex Corp. v. Bradley Time, 460 F. Supp. 383, 199 U.S.P.Q.
525 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (characteristically turgid patentese); Gould, Inc. v.
1977) (word usage created
Graphic Controls Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. 13 (N.D. Ill.
an unfortunate semantic mire).
335. 199 U.S.P.Q. 203 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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lidity." 336
Patent lawyers get into especially embarrassing situations
when they appear as expert witnesses. In Bergstrom v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 337 a former professor, now a practitioner, who
had testified as to an arcane point of law was confronted on
cross with one of his earlier contrary publications. The opinion
quotes extensively and approvingly from his earlier work.
Finally, three cases echoed "[tJhe frequent jest that the
massive financial and time burdens of complex patent litigation
result in everybody's loss except the lawyers may not be far
from the truth. '338 This sounds pretty bad, but it's not all the
lawyers' fault. The dissenting judge in Gould, Inc. v. United
States339 may have revealed much of the real difficulty: "It may
be we of the judiciary have an unconscious hostility towards the
patent system. Our lives would certainly be easier if it did not
exist. '340 A not insubstantial part of the patent bar and of the
bench seems to be working toward that end.
B.

Fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office

Ever since the Supreme Court's 1965 decision of Walker
336. Id.; cf. Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 10
(E.D. La. 1977) (defendant's counsel attempted to "foist a groundless defense," and otherwise "needlessly wasted the time of both plaintiff and the

court").
337. 457 F. Supp. 213, 199 U.S.P.Q. 269 (D. Minn. 1978); accord, Solvex
Corp. v. Freeman, 199 U.S.P.Q. 726 (N.D. Va. 1977) (lawyer-professor-witness "testified at length" against a patent, but when the accounts were being settled and it appeared that "the attorneys fees requested . . .total
close to the amount of damages that plaintiff requested" the witness' fees
were slashed by over 85%).
338. E.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 197
U.S.P.Q. 342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d 979, 201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir.
1978) (deciding 37 separate lawsuits after some ten interim decisions and
five interlocutory appeals); Lee Pharma'l v. Denmat, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 62
(C.D. Cal. 1976), where the court stated:
This case, which at its inception involved issues of no great complexity,
has become a gigantic, grotesque monster of procedural strife which is
[T]his court
about to consume the parties and the court as well ....
cannot help but feel that the parties are more anxious to bring about
financial collapse of their opposition than to move this case toward final
solution.
In Instrumentation Specialities Co. v. Waters Assocs., 196 U.S.P.Q. 684 (N.D.
1977), the situation was even worse:
Ill.
[T]he parties . . .here filed an unbelievable quantity of vituperative
pleadings and other documents, even for a patent case .... Either liquid chromatographic instrumentation is very profitable to make and
sell and plaintiff's invention, if any, is second in importance only to the
invention of the wheel, or we have another, example of patent counsel
overkill.

339. 579 F.2d 571, 198 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
340. Id. at 586, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 169 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
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Process Equipment,Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,341
each year has brought about an increase in the number of reported decisions where fraud, lack of candor, unclean hands, or
similar inequitable conduct on the part of patent applicants has
been alleged. Walker's combination of authorizing a Clayton
Act treble damage award to defendants who succeed in establishing a fraudulent attempt to monopolize, coupled with a holding that conduct less reprehensible than intentional fraud is
sufficient to invalidate, has unquestionably been responsible for
this upsurge.
For a number of years, it almost seemed that being accused
of fraud was like being accused of paternity. A nomination was
an election. The standard of conduct always was just a bit
higher than the particular patentee's behavior. Then the pendulum swung the other way. While it is difficult to explain this
phenomenon, unquestionably a few cases have had a disproportionate impact.
One significant case was Pfizer, Inc. v. InternationalRectifier
Corp.342 In Pfizer, the trial court had granted summary judgment based on a variety of episodes of allegedly inequitable conduct, holding that the prosecution amounted "at the very least
[to] a calculated recklessness about the truth for the purpose of
obtaining a patent containing the broadest possible product and
process claims." Moreover, as a matter of law, the withholding
of material "facts and beliefs" bearing on issues of anticipation,
obviousness, or breadth of claims would constitute unclean
hands. There was, according to the district court, a duty to disclose any fact
' ' 3 or belief that "may be relevant to an issue of patentability.
On appeal, the summary judgment of invalidity was reversed and the case remanded for a full hearing. First, the appellate court found issues of fact as to "matters of intent, good
faith, and credibility" which should not have been resolved by a
summary proceeding.3"
Second, it specifically held that a duty tc disclose any facts
or beliefs that "may be relevant to an issue of patentability" was
improper. This "imposes an unworkable standard of conduct
upon the patent applicant and expands the inequitable conduct
defense beyond legitimate limits." The standard of conduct in
prosecuting applications "is not one of strict liability for inno341. 382 U.S. 172, 147 U.S.P.Q. 404 (1965).

342. 538 F.2d 180, 190 U.S.P.Q. 273 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'g 186 U.S.P.Q. 511

(D. Minn. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040, 192 U.S.P.Q. 543 (1977).
343. Id. at 185, 190 U.S.P.Q. at 278.
344. Id. at 185, 190 U.S.P.Q. at 277.
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cent or even negligent omissions or misstatements.
. [but] the
misconduct must be accompanied by 'some element of wrongfulness, wilfulness, or bad faith'." Proof of such misconduct
must be established by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evi345
dence.,
The Pfizer opinion concluded with a paragraph that, as predicted, is frequently repeated in the decisions:
The basic issues in this case are the validity and enforceability
of the patent alleged to have been infringed. An infringement defendant in complex litigation should not be permitted to sidestep
these main issues by nitpicking the patent file in every minute respect with the effect of trying the patentee personally, rather than
the patent. Patentee's oversights are easily magnified out of proportion by one accused of infringement seeking to escape the reach
of the patent by hostilely combing the inventor's files in liberal pretrial discovery proceedings. Unjustified damage to professional
and social reputations can result, as here, without fostering any
corresponding public benefit in the form
34 6 of inhibiting future improvident grants of patent monopolies.
The PTO, in response to the many fraud charges brought
before the courts-and to the PTO-issued the so-called "Dann
Amendments." 347 These provided, among other things, for reissues to redetermine patentability, greater public access to protest and public use proceedings, a redefined duty on the part of
patent applicants to disclose material facts to the Office, and the
voluntary provision of prior art statements. Last but not least, a
few courts have awarded attorneys' fees to the successful plaintiffs where the defendant irresponsibly made a "fraud on the
348
Patent Office" charge.
This past year, for the first time since Walker Process, the
number of "fraud" cases has diminished markedly. Further, as
will appear, there have been a number of clear holdings to the
effect that a patent applicant need not disclose a possibly anticipatory-reference, on sale, or public use under 35 U.S.C. section
102-if he, in good faith, believes that the reference, etc., either
349
is not anticipatory or is not a statutory reference.
1. Intent

The courts this past year have emphasized that a willful, deliberate, grossly negligent, or otherwise improper intent is indispensible to proof of an unclean hands defense. Thus, even
345. Id. at 187, 190 U.S.P.Q. at 274.

346. Id. at 196, 190 U.S.P.Q. at 286.
347. 955 O.G. 1054 (February 22, 1977).
348. See Eltra Corp. v. Basic, Inc., 193 U.S.P.Q. 426 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
349. See Judge Lacey, A FederalDistrictJudge's Views on Patent Reissue
Protest and Duty of Disclosure, 68 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'Y 529 (1978).
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though a reference "should have been cited," if it did not anticipate or make the claimed invention obvious, there was no bad
faith. 350 While the deliberate withholding of a reference "may
tend to indicate a certain lack of candor," without more, this is
35 1
not invalidating unclean hands.
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,352 the court considered a number of unclean hands charges. Even where one of
353
the patents was invalid on a known section 102(d) defense,
this was only simple negligence. In another instance, 3 54 the
court found a deliberate intent to withhold a reference from the
Office; it found 355 yet "another example of ... unwillingness
• . .to say whatever was necessary"; and-believe it or not-criticized the attorney for referring to a prior art patent only by
number in the specification, stating, "The Heinze patent was
never cited nor referred to by the patent examiner during the
prosecution of the '037 patent, but was referred to (by number
'356
only) in the specification of the '037 patent.
2. Anticipatory PriorArt
A new phenomenon has emerged this year: even where a
prior reference or other art is anticipatory in a section 102 sense,
if an applicant believes in good faith that it is either not anticipatory or not statutory prior art, the courts have tended to excul35 7
pate him from liability.
Of course, if the reference, or other art, is in fact anticipatory prior art, then the patent is invalid. But lack of malicious or
negligent intent prevents an award of attorney' fees and/or, in
an appropriate case, a treble antitrust damage award-along
350. Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 10 (E.D. La.
1977).
351. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 433 F. Supp. 666, 196
U.S.P.Q. 351 (S.D. Ill. 1977); see Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp.,

446 F. Supp. 1056, 199 U.S.P.Q. 401 (D. Neb. 1978); AMP, Inc. v. Bunker Ramo
Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 200 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
352. 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d 979,
201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir. 1978).
353. See notes 357-62 and accompanying text infra.
354. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc. 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q.
342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d 979, 201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir. 1978).

355. Id. at 732, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 414.
356. Id. at 753, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 432. "It seems to be standard operating
procedure for many practitioners before the patent office to downplay any
prior art which might constitute an obstacle to patentability."
357. Cf.In re Lund, 376 F.2d 982, 153 U.S.P.Q. 625 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (public

knowledge constitutes constructive knowledge); Monaco v. Hoffman, 189 F.
Supp. 474, 127 U.S.P.Q. 516 (D.D.C.), affd, 293 F.2d 883, 130 U.S.P.Q. 97 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (must in good faith believe he is first inventor).
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with possible additional sanctions such as disbarment, criminal
proceedings, or the like.
The first case in which anticipatory prior art (a section
102(d) reference) was intentionally withheld was Duplan.35 8
35
The court found this to be simple negligence only.

9

In two cases the Office struck reissue applications on the
ground that a "fraud," within the meaning of Rule 56,360 had

been perpetrated during prosecution of the original application.
In In re Stockebrand,361 the attorney had not disclosed "prior
public use or on sale" events as well as "relevant" prior art, and
he "knew or reasonably should have known" the invention was
on sale. Confirmation of the attorney's malafides was found in
a correspondence in which he had advised the inventor that
"you're late."
Similarly, in In re Altenpohl,362 the Office deliberately withheld the reissue applicant's father's earlier patent, which had
been held by the CCPA to be an anticipation, resulting in the
striking of the reissue application. It stated:
[G] ood faith and subjective intent, while they are to be considered,
should not necessarily be made controlling. Under ordinary circumstances, the fact of misrepresentation coupled with proof that
the party making it had knowledge of its falsity is enough to warrant drawing the inference that there was a fraudulent intent.
Where public policy demands a complete and accurate disclosure,
it may suffice to show nothing more than that the misrepresentations 3were
made in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their
63
truth.
358. 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342 (D.S.C. 1977).
359. See Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 456 F. Supp. 213, 199 U.S.P.Q.
269 (D. Minn. 1978) (not improper to withhold inventor's commercial activities, particularly when court finds they are not invalidating); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 457 F. Supp. 482, 198 U.S.P.Q. 529 (N.D. Ind.
1978) (bonafide belief it was experimental and no willfulness or bad faith in
non-disclosure will not constitute fraud); Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 197
U.S.P.Q. 83 (D.N.D.) (no duty to disclose public use which was believed in
good faith to be experimental; it was an experimental prototype that did not
invalidate), modified, 570 F.2d 778, 197 U.S.P.Q. 209 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825, 200 U.S.P.Q. 64 (1979) (dicta: "a patent applicant has an
uncompromising duty toward the patent office to disclose all pertinent
facts"); Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp., 456 F. Supp. 520, 196 U.S.P.Q. 238 (D.
Utah 1977) (intentional failure to disclose prior public use invalidates patent; there was no "fraudulent intent or grossly reckless conduct"); cf.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 1211,
197 U.S.P.Q. 164 (E.D. Tex. 1977) (apparently court criticized the patentee
for not disclosing certain events, especially the work of a foreign collaborator, that did not appear to be statutory prior art).
360. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).
361. 197 U.S.P.Q. 857 (C.P.T. 1978).
362. 198 U.S.P.Q. 289 (C.P.T. 1976).
363. Id. at 310; accord, Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 799, 167 U.S.P.Q. 532
(C.C.P.A. 1970). The court continued:

19791

3.

Recent Developments

Relevant but Not Anticipatory PriorArt

Some of the cases discussed earlier have dealt with disclosure, or failure to disclose, prior art that is not anticipatory, but
is "relevant," "material," or "pertinent" to the claimed invention. 364 In each instance, the applicant's subjective intent was a
factor in assessing his failure to disclose. And, necessarily, the
court's objective determination of whether the reference invalidated the patent figured in its assessment of the consequences
of non-disclosure.
Only one case is of special significance. In Tapeswitch Corp.
of America v. Recora Co.,365 the court recognized that there is a
difference in the kind of "fraud" necessary to hold a patent unenforceable and that needed to invoke section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
4.

Miscellaneous Cases

A few "fraud" cases represent tributes to the ingenuity of
applicants and their counsel-or to that of infringers and theirs.
366
In Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc.,
failure to disclose a "necessary element," that is, the need for an
impervious material as carpet backing tape, was "knowingly
providing an inadequate disclosure," constituting a fraudulent
concealment of the best mode under section 112. Thereafter,
filing a continuation-in-part directed to an impervious tape confirmed the "fraud."
A jury in Solvex Corp. v. Freeman367 found intentional misleading of the Office in offering to supply the Examiner with a
commercial success affidavit at a time when there was no commercial success.
Even plant patents are not immune from fraud charges. The
court in Pan-AmericanPlant Co. v. Matsui 368 held that a specification incorrectly describing a plant as "producing very few
A patent applicant's duty of disclosure to the patent office extends to

prior art or other facts known to him which would anticipate the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102, or which, but for the nondisclosure, would
have prevented the patent from issuing or would have restricted the

scope of the claims.
198 U.S.P.Q. at 310, quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 170
U.S.P.Q. 482 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affid, 179 U.S.P.Q. 209 (9th Cir. 1973). The stan-

dard of the "Dann Amendments" is more comprehensive as to the present
standard of conduct.
364. See notes 86-99 and accompanying text supra.
365. 196 U.S.P.Q. 348 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
366. 197 U.S.P.Q. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
367. 199 U.S.P.Q. 726 (W.D. Va. 1977).
368. 433 F. Supp. 693, 198 U.S.P.Q. 462 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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culls" was "clearly inaccurate"; this was "especially troubling
because [the applicant] knew that the . . . plant material pro-

duced 50-60% culls. Such a knowing inaccuracy raises the spectre of fraud and serious questions about the validity of the
'3 69
patent.
But one man's fraud is another's acceptable conduct. Although Rule 56 holds that an application may be stricken if it is
signed without having been "inspected" by the applicant; the
question is how much inspection is necessary. In Jessel v. Newland,370 the board had recommended that Jessel's plant patent
application in interference be stricken because it contained a
major error in classifying the claimed plant, and this supported
Jessel's testimony by one of the joint applicants that he had not
inspected the application. The deputy commissioner, however,
in Jessel v. Newland,3 71 declined to hold that "inspect" in Rule 56
was the same as "read" but agreed that a fraud had been perpetrated when the applicant had neither read nor inspected the
application.
On further appeal to then-Commissioner Dann in Newland
v. Jessel,372 he held that the party's "behavior was not so serious
a departure from acceptable standards as to require striking the
...application." He explained:
What is needed to constitute actual inspection? It is certainly
desirable that applicants read their applications carefully and completely before signing them. When the applicant is illiterate, blind,
or does not understand English, it is acceptable for the application
to be read to him or explained in a way that allows him to suppose
with some confidence that the application he is called on to sich
covers the invention that he believes he had invented. On the other
hand, a signing in blank or with no inspection and without other
circumstances reasonably leading to such confidence on the part of
the applicant would justify striking the application as in essence
not vouched for by the applicant.
In the present case, it is contended that Mix [one of party Jessel's co-inventors] adequately inspected the application at the time
of signing when he looked at the picture of the flower and discussed
the application with his attorney ....
All of this adds up to something more than a heedless signing
in blank, though it is doubtful whether it is enough to qualify as an
actual inspection ....

There is no suggestion that Mix's failure to read the application
Patent and Trademark Office in
was part of an effort to deceive the373
any way or that it had that effect.

369. Id. at 697 n.7, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 466 n.7.
370. 195 U.S.P.Q. 674 (B.P.I. 1977).
371. 195 U.S.P.Q. 678 (C.P.T. 1977).
372. 196 U.S.P.Q. 504 (C.P.T. 1977).
373. Id. at 505.

19791

Recent Developments

Ultimately holding that striking was discretionary, the Commissioner declined to strike.
CONCLUSION

This past year, a number of courts have complained of the
recent proliferation of patent and antitrust litigation.3 7 4 In Dunlap Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., the court placed part of the
blame on the United States Patent Office for failing "to say 'no'
to any patent solicitor who has the persistance to prosecute a
patent through as many as six rejections.

' 37 5

The result is that

many of the patents fail to withstand the stern tests of sections
102 and 103 under current case law. 376 This is a low note to end

the year for the Patent Office.

374. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q.
342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 595 F.2d 979, 201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir. 1978); cf.
Gould, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d at 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 168 (Nichols, J.,
dissenting) (judicial hostility towards the patent system).
375. 444 F. Supp. 648, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342 (D.S.C. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d
979, 201 U.S.P.Q. 641 (4th Cir. 1978).
376. Id. at 772 n.90, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 446 n.90, where the court stated:
While this court would not associate itself with the views of one judge
who characterized the United States Patent Office as the 'sickest institution that our government has ever invented' and 'the weakest link in the
competitive system in America,' see Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 at
p.536 (8th Cir. 1972), it is not alone in its impression that patent examiners can be prevailed upon to issue patents on a wide variety of devices
which do not always comport with statutory and constitutional requirements. In the present case, Judge Hemphill had occasion to observe that:
"Writing patent claims is like trying to define the shape of a cloud.
If one can precisely define the shape of a cloud by detailing where all
particular pieces go together, the examiner will give a person a patent
on it." (citation omitted)
That Judge Hemphill's observation may not be as whimsical as it
sounds is perhaps best illustrated by PX 1313 introduced by plaintiffs'
trial. It is United States Patent No. 3,936,384 issued on a bar of soap with a
religious symbol which is embossed with religious markings. Claims 2
and 3 are dependent on claim 1.

